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Chapter 1
Introduction
The potential damages of Climate Change are considered today as almost certain if con-
crete steps against it are not financed and put in place by governments around the world.
Raising sea levels, droughts, unpredictable weather events, usually with a potential never
recorded in the past, are few among many consequences of raising temperatures and
changing climate. In light of this, politicians, non-governmental organizations and a
growing share of the civil society are engaging to make binding greenhouse gas emission
reductions part of international agreements. After years of scarce results, at the end of
2015, the 21st Conference of the Parties held in Paris saw developed and developing na-
tions agree on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and limiting the global average
temperature increase to 1.5◦C. This represents a very important result, as increases in
global average temperatures have important negative consequences on the environment,
which ultimately affect the financial health of a country. In fact, possible temperature
increases and consequent catastrophes can have serious effects on a country’s and on the
world’s financial stability. It is then important to estimate the financial impacts of such
catastrophes.
In the first part of this manuscript, we model the negative externalities of a positive-
drifted stochastic temperature process on the global Gross Domestic Product. We analyse
the choices of a decision maker in terms of when to invest a fraction of the global GDP
and at what temperature level, when confronted with a potential environmental catas-
trophe. In a real options setting, we find that the optimal temperature level at which to
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invest a fraction of GDP is dependent on the uncertainty surrounding the temperature
process. The investment threshold is an increasing function of the volatility when the
latter is small. Conversely, it is a decreasing function of the volatility for higher levels
of the latter, due to a greater risk of a potential climate catastrophe. For what concerns
the fraction of GDP to be invested in mitigation, it increases with volatility, meaning
that more uncertainty causes more expenditures in mitigation as the temperature pro-
cess has to be controlled more powerfully, but it is always positive and at the optimum
higher than adaptation expenditures, proving that the decision maker cannot chose not
to intervene.
Having found and quantified the links between raising temperatures, GDP and mitiga-
tion, we move our attention to the choices that a decision maker has in terms of emission
reduction strategies. However, the set of choices is vast, and these are extremely het-
erogeneous in terms of funding needed and GHG reduction potential. Moreover, it is
important that mitigation strategies are designed around each country’s characteristics.
In fact, each country, in particular in the developing world, has its own peculiarities, and
unique/global strategies can prove unsuccessful or damaging if not designed around each
country’s needs, goals and reduction potential. Mitigation strategies then differ accord-
ing to the country or area of analysis. As an example, among the biggest contributors
to global greenhouse gas concentrations we find deforestation and energy consumption,
the first affecting mainly South America and some areas of Asia, such as Indonesia and
Malaysia, the second particularly evident in the economies in transition in South East
Asia, such as India or China, or in the most developed countries around the world. As
a consequence, avoiding deforestation and forest degradation and improving energy effi-
ciency have been considered by experts as two very powerful ways of mitigating climate
change, given their very high GHG reduction potential. This thesis wants to contribute
to both causes. Indeed, in the second part, we analyse the optimal choices of a forester
that has the chance to enter a Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-
dation (REDD) scheme, thus protecting its forest and receiving, as compensation for
avoiding deforestation, a stochastic REDD permit price. We analyse how the decision to
participate in the scheme changes when different values of the choice variables are taken.
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We find that when the forester is allowed to deforest at his own optimal rate, he cuts
his entire forest in just a few years. Conversely, when deforestation rates are bounded
from above, he finds optimal to enter a REDD scheme in finite time. These results are
confirmed even when risk aversion is taken into consideration. The more risk averse is
the forester, the later he optimally enters a REDD scheme, thus deforesting more land.
Such results confirm the usefulness of an intermediary agent in the market, such as a
REDD manager, that bears the risk of a stochastic REDD price. Only in this case it
is possible to incentivize the forester to participate in the scheme sooner, thus saving a
bigger portion of its forest.
Finally, in the third part, we analyse a financing scheme whose goal is subsidizing the pro-
duction of super energy efficient fans. Tackling climate change and promoting investments
that award energy savings and efficiency is particularly important in the developing world
and in South East Asia in the specific. Here coal power plants have to satisfy the need for
electricity of a growing number of citizens. In China and India, a green revolution could
mean a huge amount of polluting emissions reduced at low prices, with a great value for
the buck. A growing number of international institutions, NGOs and development banks
is channelling investments for the development of energy savings projects, mainly in the
form of improved efficiency. One example is the Super Efficient Equipment Program in
India, which is financially sponsored by the Clean Technology Fund with an amount of
$50,000,000 and whose goal is a reduction in electricity consumption of 19,000 Megawatts
in three years, by introducing a subsidy for the production of super efficient electric fans
in India. We see that the barriers that such financing scheme has to face are too strong
for a subsidy to work. Our results show that, due to a particular structure of the Indian
retail markets, an important share of funds is wasted, and the reductions achieved in
terms of electricity, and consequently greenhouse gas emissions, are negligible.
Chapter 2
Market Uncertainty and Risk Transfer
in REDD Projects
Joint work with Marc Chesney and Jonathan Gheyssens
This paper has been submitted as Chesney, M., J. Gheyssens, and B. Troja, Market Uncertainty
and Risk Transfer in REDD Projects, to the Journal of Sustainable Forestry.
Abstract
The central role played by deforestation in the increase in global CO2 emissions has recently
justified the development of new schemes which offer compensation in exchange for reductions in
emissions from deforestation (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation,
REDD). The design of REDD projects can be based on market prices to set compensation terms.
With limited experiments involving a true market integration of REDD, it remains however dif-
ficult to assess the potential impact market price uncertainties may have on the targets of the
protective scheme.
The goal of this article is to assess the optimal choices of a forester, in terms of deforestation
rate and time length, given his option to enter an irreversible REDD scheme that provides him
with stochastic cash flows under different risk aversion scenarios.
Keywords: Climate Change, Deforestation, REDD, Real Options, Risk Aversion
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2.1 Introduction
According to the IPCC (IPCC, 2014), land use change and forestry activities are among the
largest conveyors of greenhouse gases (GHG) and are likely responsible for 15% to 20% of global
emissions in recent years.
Triggered by an increase in commodity prices, lack of land tenure and local consumption, world
forest cover experienced an average loss of 7.6 million hectares per annum from 2010 to 2015
(FAO, 2015), mostly in tropical areas that support large biodiversity hotspots (albeit with cur-
rent reduction in the observed deforestation for Brazil and Indonesia).
The removal of forests has various well-documented, negative environmental impacts including:
damages to habitat and biodiversity loss, aridity, soil erosion and ecosystem disruption. These
impacts are compounded by the fact that tropical forests are recognized as highly efficient car-
bon sink, capable of holding 50% more carbon per hectare than forests in temperate and boreal
areas (IPCC, 2014). This advantage has prompted efforts to integrate avoided deforestation in
finance mechanisms against climate change, albeit with mixed results.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the clean development mechanism (CDM) allows for afforestation
and reforestation projects and so far has been initially preferred to the development of projects
targeting the reduction in emission from deforestation and degradation (REDD). The reason
for this can be found in technical and methodological issues, such as measurability, baseline
calculation and risk of leakage.
A REDD scheme awards those foresters whose deforestation rate is lower than a given base-
line, with tradable permits. Such permits can be marketed and sold to the foresters who did
not manage to keep their deforestation rate below a baseline. By doing so, the seller of the
REDD permits is compensated for avoiding deforestation. Moreover, REDD schemes, which are
expected to provide a large volume of permits at lower marginal price, could prove especially
interesting to the companies that find reducing emissions internally to be prohibitively expensive
or those needing to buy an important volume of permits (Peters-Stanley et al., 2013).
The Paris Conference of Parties (COP-21) has restated the importance of building capacity
for REDD projects with the adoption of new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Indeed,
through the SDGs, the Conference of the Parties explicitly recognizes the importance of forests,
urging the international community to "protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terres-
trial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land
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degradation and biodiversity loss". REDD actions are already contributing to the achievement
of these objectives.
If projects are to be developed according to the commonly accepted blueprints, one of the most
crucial changes from previous attempts to compensate reduced deforestation will be the involve-
ment of carbon markets and their volatile prices. While price uncertainty is not new to forester
managers (see section 2.2), the effects of stochastic payments for environmental services (PES)
on REDD scheme performance is still very much in debate.
Our aim in this paper is to analyse and to model the optimal timing of a REDD investment. As
detailed in section 2.4, our model involves the combined decision of choosing when to join the
scheme (knowing that the decision to protect is irreversible), and the deforestation rate prior
to it. The trade-off being that higher prior revenues from extraction limit the size of forest to
protect and hence the potential PES revenues from REDD.
Our model accounts for the likely presence of risk aversion amongst foresters, a characteristic
that could change the attractiveness of the REDD scheme, i.e. by reducing the willingness to
enter into it, while improving the risk transfer potential of a forester-manager configuration. In
fact, as Parks (1995) has already highlighted, risk aversion is one of the main drivers of land
use changes and deforestation. Understanding how risk aversion influences the optimal decision
of a forester could also improve also the risk transfer potential of a forester-manager configu-
ration. Furthermore, our model justifies the existence of a REDD manager (along the lines of
the protected area management (PAM) model) who can serve as a middle-man between the
REDD market and the forester. Therefore, in the context of our dynamic, stochastic model,
we test the influence of the REDD managers whose presence is often justified by their ability
to shield the foresters from price volatility (by proposing instead a deterministic price formula),
thus providing an effective instrument to overcome those issues arising from the forester’s risk
aversion profile and which can hinder the success of a REDD scheme.
In order to solve our dynamic model with and without the presence of risk aversion, we rely on a
real options setting, as described in general terms by Pindyck (2000) and in the case of forestry
investments by Insley (2002) and Kassar and Lasserre (2004). This choice is well-suited in case of
uncertainty about future cash flows and future risks (Baranzini et al., 2003). Moreover, since the
decision to enter a forest protection scheme has often been treated as a once-and-for-all decision
by the literature, real options allows us to identify the optimal entry time in such investment,
while taking into account the irreversibility of the commitment (Chesney et al., 2016).
Real option models are particularly well adapted to such optimal stopping problems. They are
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used in order to check whether or not investment decisions should be taken. The standard tool
used in this setting before real options were introduced is the Net Present Value (NPV in what
follows) approach according to which, an investment should be realized if and only if its NPV,
i.e. the difference between its expected discounted payoffs and costs, is positive. This latter
criteria is static to the extent to which the choice is between realizing the investment at the
date when the NPV is calculated, or never. This is a significant drawback of the NPV criterion.
If investment opportunities are considered as real options, the investor has the right, and not
the obligation, to make an investment during a given period of time. When identifying the
optimal investment date, the possibility of postponing the investment is taken into account. See
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an excellent reference. Usually, the timing of the investment is the
objective of these models. In fact the concept of option value was introduced in environmental
economics before the appearance of real options (Arrow and Fisher, 1974; Henry, 1974; Fisher
and Krutilla, 1975). It stresses that performing an irreversible action at one point in time in-
volves the cost of renouncing the flexibility to wait; if this cost is correctly taken into account
in a cost benefit analysis, in order for the action to be economically justified, the benefits from
the decision must be higher than in a traditional cost benefit analysis.
Results show that the forester has no incentive to enter into a REDD scheme in the case where
he can freely choose how much of his land to deforest. However, when the authority sets limits
on the annual deforestation rate, he participates in the REDD scheme in a finite time and with
a positive fraction of forest left for protection. Results are also dependent on the discount rate.
Lower discount rates postpone the decision to enter into a REDD scheme, while higher ones,
as is the case in many developing countries, prove to be an incentive, anticipating his optimal
time to participate in REDD. Moreover, risk aversion postpones the optimal date at which the
forester should optimally enter into the REDD scheme. This last finding justifies the design of
REDD policies based on the transfer of market risk from the forester to an intermediary, e.g. a
REDD project manager.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview of the state of research in the
combined fields of PES, PAM and environmental real options, at the crossroad of which lies our
model. Section 2.3 introduces our setting and our model assumptions. Section 2.4 outlines the
numerical method used to solve our model and the choice of parameters. Section 2.5 gives the
main results and the key findings, followed by Section 2.5 which offers sensitivity analyses and
a general discussion of our results. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
Apart from the decentralized financial element provided by the CDMmarket, projects on avoided
deforestation have already been extensively tested under national development plans and im-
portant literature has emerged to document the complex, integrated and multi-layered processes
driving deforestation. As underlined by Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) and Angelsen (2007),
deforestation rates and harvesting patterns depend largely on a combination of local factors and
global drivers: the degree of input/output markets integration, land tenure, access to capital
and technological change, population pressure, migration and trade equilibria.
One of the first thoroughly documented performance assessments of a REDD prototype, the Noel
Kempff climate action project in Bolivia (Grieg-Gran (2008) and Boyd (2009)), has reinforced
the idea that reaching a win-win situation in a REDD project is a complex task embedding
trade-offs between preservation, access to resources and efficiency of compensation. As noted by
Asquith et al. (2002), in the short run, certain sections of the local communities are financially
poorer. Forest protection projects clearly have the potential to sequester [carbon], protect biodi-
versity and simultaneously contribute to sustainable rural development, but if they really are to
improve rural livelihoods, they must be designed and implemented carefully and participatively.
To that goal, REDD projects benefit from being currently at the junction of different research
fields that deal with specific characteristics of the new avoided deforestation schemes.
The first characteristic is related to the economic estimates of avoided deforestation projects,
taking into account spatial and economic variability. Grieg-Gran (2008) finds, as a result of a
cross-country comparative analysis, that tropical forests represent in general an inexpensive way
to mitigate climate change, with the notable exception of areas suitable for high values crops
such as palm oil. Kindermann et al. (2008) conclude that the marginal costs are highly region-
sensitive, with the lowest-cost region being Africa, followed by Central and South America and
Southeast Asia.
The second line of research is focused on payments for environmental service (PES), which assess
the incentive and performance aspects of compensation schemes. Through simulations based on
a nationwide conservation program implemented in Mexican ejidos, Alix-Garcia et al. (2012)
find that to ensure the maximum environmental benefits, flat payment should be replaced by
conditional compensation schemes. Using observable results from the Costa Rican national PES
scheme, Engel et al. (2009) conclude along the same lines that better PES targeting, using local
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flexible payments and comprehensive assessment of the project’s cost and threats, greatly im-
prove its performance.
A third area of literature on protected area management (PAM) integrates conservation and
development projects (ICDP), which have provided numerous insights into the complex combi-
nation of incentivizing policies deployed to ensure environmental preservation while extending
local population’s welfare. Muller and Albers (2004) evaluate the best mix of patrolling, agricul-
tural project development and conservation payments for different market settings. They find
that the efficiency of any policy instrument is highly dependent on the constraining nature of
market access (whether it is complete market or missing labour/resources access). Robinson and
Dupeyrat (2005) and Robinson et al. (2008) extend the PAM analysis to forestry and assess the
implications of excluding rural people from newly protected forests.
An additional strand of research is the role played by market price uncertainty on deforestation
schemes. Among the first to work on this question, Lembersky and Johnson (1975) introduce
stochastic prices and inventory to define optimal harvesting. Miller and Voltaire (1983) extend
their analysis to an ongoing rotation problem while Clarke and Reed (1990) define the optimal
rotation problem in continuous time.
Using the seminal results from real options investment decisions, the forest management lit-
erature starts using optimal decision time in the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility to
model forest extraction. Morck et al. (1989) use the contingent claims approach to determine
the optimal rotation strategy under conditions of uncertainty. They assess the value of a forestry
lease as the value of the option to cut down trees at the most advantageous time and allow for
the possibility to halt production in case timber prices are too low. Thomson (1992) derives
optimal forest rotation age when stumpage prices follow a diffusion process and employs the
binomial model for the valuation of the standing forest. Plantinga (1998) shows analytically
that reservation price policies can be very important in incorporating the option value of a for-
est when analysing optimal rotations, while Insley (2002) relies on the dynamic programming
approach for characterizing the dynamics of the forest value, allowing for both geometric Brow-
nian motion and mean reversion for the timber price process. An important recent contribution
is the one of Alvarez and Koskela (2007), who analyse the partial and complete depletion har-
vesting policies under resource stock and price uncertainty and risk neutrality. They find that
giving the manager the flexibility of partial sequential deforestation increases the value of the
forest as compared with the case in which harvesting can be exercised only once. Moreover,
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Monge et al. (2016) examine in a stochastic setting the trade-off between risk and returns of
a forester/farmer. The authors find that, as risk aversion increases, a farmer would trade-off
higher returns for a more certain stream of income. Finally, Pana and Gheyssens (2016), solving
a dynamic model of land conversion from forest to agriculture in the presence of REDD, assess
the performance of four baselines. They show that none of the assessed baselines dominates
in all performance aspects, and that the final baseline choice needs to maximise the trade-off
between the effectiveness to reduce deforestation, cost-efficiency, as well as changes in income.
While real options have been commonly used to analyse investment or divestment strategies,
and while risk aversion has found in forestry a favourable field of study, the two have rarely
been jointly applied in the literature to analyse the market for REDD permits, and the optimal
investment strategy of a forester in terms of REDD projects. The impact of risk aversion is
mitigated through the introduction of an intermediary REDD manager who bears the market
risk of REDD, freeing the forester from it.
Analysing the impacts of risk aversion in forestry and land use change is also justified by the
literature, such as Parks (1995), which finds that risk aversion is one important driver of defor-
estation and land use changes which are the practices that a REDD scheme aims to limit.
In order to establish how forest ecosystem services can be integrated into farming activities,
Monge, Parker and Richardson examine in a stochastic setting the trade-off between risk and
returns of a forester and how this influences his productive activities. They find that "a risk-
averse farmer would trade off higher returns for a more steady stream of income". However,
they do not provide indications as to how risk aversion can influence the intensity of farming,
the amount of forest saved and the optimal timing of the forester/farmer’s decision. In REDD
projects, managing risk aversion is a key success factor as clearly stated by Blennow and Salinas
(2006). One of the few works that relate real options and risk aversion is the one by Morel and
Morel (2012), who propose a real option framework where the risk of a REDD project, solely
aimed at reducing deforestation rates, is shared between the agents in the market "providing
a per hectare payment that favours the conservation of forests containing higher biomass per
hectare". However, the authors do not provide a price threshold triggering the option. We
differentiate our research from the one of Morel and Morel (2012) first, by comparing how the
forester’s investment strategy changes when the risk perception of the REDD scheme changes;
second, our model allows us to analyse which optimal investment threshold, in terms of REDD
permit price, triggers the option to enter into the REDD scheme.
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In synthesis, we contribute to the literature by developing a dynamic real options model capable
of taking into account market failures and imperfect hedging in forest conservation decisions,
examining the realistic setting where a forester has to bear part of the risk of the REDD project.
This allows us to identify the optimal entry time into a REDD project, and to gage the impact
of risk aversion on this optimum.
2.3 The Model
Our methodology relies on several extensions around a core first scenario which is presented in
Section 2.3.2 and models the optimal choice of a risk neutral forester who has to decide when to
optimally participate in a REDD scheme and what level of pre-REDD deforestation is optimal
for him. An important improvement (Section 2.3.3) is the introduction of risk aversion for
the forester, an individual behaviour that is common among local forest dwellers in developing
countries and one which could have a strong impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of market-
based REDD schemes.
2.3.1 A benchmark case: no REDD scheme
In the simplest scenario, a forester’s decision is the determination of his constant extraction rate
d, expressed in hectares of land deforested per unit of time, which he deforests for a given number
of years τ , such that his intertemporal profits are maximized, under the simple constraint that
the total deforested area through the extraction time can not be larger than his owned area of
land λ. We can write the forester’s maximization as
max
d
∫ τ
0
(Pf (t)d− c(d))e−δtdt (2.1)
under the constraint that
d · τ ≤ λ (2.2)
where Pf (t) represents the timber price at each time t and which follows the deterministic
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setting:
dPf (t) = φPf (t)dt (2.3)
with φ the growth rate of the timber price.
Following Cherian et al. (1999), we assume a quadratic harvesting cost function c(). This
assumption allows for increasing marginal costs and the absence of costs for zero deforestation:
c(d(t)) = a1d(t) + a2d(t)
2 (2.4)
with a1 and a2 the calibrated coefficients (see section 2.4). Under this simple setting, the forester
has to account for the cost of extraction represented by the quadratic function c(d), and the
fractions of his land deforested at each point in time, modelled by the choice variable d.
2.3.2 A first case: a risk neutral forester deciding on a risky
REDD project
Our initial model represents in stylized facts the behaviour of a risk-neutral forest manager who
acts in a perfectly competitive market with fixed timber prices and the ability to voluntarily
participate in a market REDD scheme at the time of his choosing (the REDD scheme is assumed
to be immediately available).
At initial time, the forester owns a stock of forest λ that he can deforest at the fixed rate of d
each time period. Each unit of forest preserved at the time of entrance into the REDD scheme is
compensated by a rental value which is considered to be fully correlated with CDM spot permits
(spot CER).
In mathematical terms, the forester faces the following inter-temporal profit maximization func-
tion:
max
L,d
EP
[∫ TL
0
(Pf (t) · d− c(d))e−δtdt+ Pr(TL) (λ− d · TL) e−δTL
]
(2.5)
where
TL = inf{t > 0 : Pr(t) ≥ L} (2.6)
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TL represents the first time at which the forester voluntarily enters the REDD scheme (and
irreversibly stops his deforestation activities) ∀t ∈ T ; for further details please refer to Appendix
A. d(t) = d is the fixed annual deforestation flow as already explained in Section 2.3.1, while
c(d) represents the quadratic harvesting cost function as described by Eq. 2.4. L is the optimal
exercise boundary (i.e. the price level at which it is optimal for the forester to enter the scheme
instead of waiting longer). In our model, we assume the irreversibility of the REDD decision.
Here Pf (t) represents the timber price at each period t which follows the deterministic setting
as described in Eq. 2.3, and Pr(t) is the stochastic rental value of one hectare of preserved
forest, which is perfectly correlated with the spot-CER price. We model the value dynamics as
a geometric Brownian motion such that:
dPr(t) = αPr(t)dt+ σPr(t)dWt
where α is the drift of the REDD price dynamics, σ their volatility and dWt the increment of a
Wiener process under the observable probability P.
As previously mentioned, λ is the initial private share of forest at the forester’s disposal. δ
represents the discount rate.
In our model, we first assume that the extraction level is set at t0 and remains fixed until the end
of the deforestation sequence at TL. This assumption is supported empirically by the existence
of long-term trade agreements under which foresters engage in the fixed delivery of pre-agreed
wood volume. Our setting would hence illustrate the forester’s decision-making process before
he enters into a new trade contract.
A second assumption of the model is the linear structure of REDD payoffs. Considering the
latest development in the financial compensation structure of REDD schemes and past projects
in project conservation, it seems clear that in reality foresters are only positively incentivized
for avoided deforestation and not penalized if they don’t succeed in curbing their deforestation
levels.
In the context of a global forest parcelled out across multiple foresters, each have the possibil-
ity of participating in the REDD scheme. If one of them deforests more than his share λ, he
encroaches another forester’s area, dispossessing him of future REDD revenues. This would call
for compensation for the forgone payments.
To solve for the different variations of our model, we rely on the real option nature of the decision
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process (uncertainty and irreversibility) to inform a numerical grid search algorithm looking for
the highest global profit on a very large interval of the decision variables.
In place of a naive algorithm, we use known analytical real option results to increase the speed
of convergence towards the global solution. The optimization is derived from a martingale ap-
proach which simplifies several expectations within the maximization function.
First of all, by relying on the continuity of the brownian motion and on the linearity property of
the expected value operator, we can recall the general optimization of the forester, as expressed
by Equation 2.5, and where the dynamics of Pf are given by Eq. 2.3.
We start by solving the first integral of Expression 2.5:
EP
[∫ TL
0
(Pf (t)d− c(d))e−δtdt
]
(2.7)
= Pf (0)d · E
[∫ TL
0
e−(δ−φ)tdt
]
− c(d) · E
[∫ TL
0
e−δtdt
]
Using the Laplace transform of the hitting time TL, we can write:
EP
[∫ TL
0
e−(δ−φ)tdt
]
=
1
(δ − φ)
(
1−
(
Pr(0)
L
)γ1)
(2.8)
where
γ1 =
−θ +
√
θ2 + 2(δ − φ)
σ
, with θ =
α− σ22
σ
and δ ≥ φ (2.9)
According to the same lines:
EP
[∫ TL
0
e−δtdt
]
=
1
δ
(
1−
(
Pf (0)
L
)γ2)
(2.10)
with:
γ2 =
−θ +√θ2 + 2δ
σ
(2.11)
The second part of Equation 2.5 can be solved as follows:
EP
[
Pr(TL) (λ− d · TL) e−δTL
]
= λ · L ·
(
Pr(0)
L
)γ2
− d · L ·
(
Pr(0)
L
)γ2
ln
(
L
Pr(0)
)
σ
√
θ2 + 2δ
(2.12)
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where we relied on the fact that, at TL, Pr(TL) = L. For a detailed derivation please refer to
Appendix B.
The forester’s problem then reduces to:
maxL,d
[Pf (0) · d
(δ − φ)
(
1−
(
Pr(0)
L
)γ1)
− c(d)
δ
(
1−
(
Pr(0)
L
)γ2)
+λ · L ·
(
Pr(0)
L
)γ2
− d · L ·
(
Pr(0)
L
)γ2
ln
(
L
Pr(0)
)
σ
√
θ2 + 2δ
]
(2.13)
where γ1 and γ2 are defined, respectively, by Eq. 2.9 and Eq. 2.11, and θ by Equation 2.9.
In this scenario, the forester decides alone whether or not to join the REDD scheme and should
fully internalize the trade-offs between the two activities.
Moreover, we initially assume that the forester is risk neutral1. Hence, he is solely interested
in the maximization of his expected profits and not influenced by their volatility. While such a
forester may very well exist, we consider this case to be a benchmark with which we will compare
the decisions of the risk averse agents defined in section 2.3.3.
2.3.3 A second case: the introduction of risk aversion
It is well documented that most local foresters in developing countries are risk-averse, with a
strong willingness to smooth the variations of their revenues. In such a context, a market-
integrated REDD project poses the problem of being more risky (due to its stochastic price)
than the deforestation revenues it seeks to replace. Therefore, the degree of risk aversion can be
crucial to the decision to join and ultimately to the adhesion rate of REDD schemes in highly
vulnerable contexts.
To model risk aversion, we use a classical CRRA utility function of the form (Szpiro, 1986):
U(x) =
x1−ρ
1− ρ (2.14)
1We assume here that the risk neutrality comes from individual risk aversion behaviour and not from
a fully diversified portfolio, which would prove unrealistic in our context.
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with ρ the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The maximization problem of the forester then
becomes:
max
L,d
EP[U(x)] (2.15)
or, given Expression 2.5:
max
L,d
EP


(∫ TL
0 (Pf (t)d− c(d))e−δtdt+ Pr(TL) (λ− d · TL) e−δTL
)1−ρ
1− ρ

 (2.16)
2.4 Model’s parameters
The regions with the highest potential for developing REDD programs are Latin America (Ama-
zon), Africa (RDC), and Indonesia (Bali, Borneo). Historically, the largest supplier of forest
carbon credits is Latin America, being accountable for nearly 60% of the 2010 total primary
market volume (Diaz et al., 2011). In the region, projects in Peru and Brazil dominate over-
whelmingly.
In order to solve our model numerically, we calibrate it using observed data. We take into con-
sideration a potential REDD project aimed at protecting the Peruvian forest from deforestation
over a time frame of 100 years. The fact that Peru has one of the richest ecosystems in the world
which includes 12 national parks and 63 remaining protected areas, makes this Latin American
country the ideal candidate for our model. The parameters used are characteristic for Peru, as
detailed in Table 2.1, and in most cases are taken from past cost/benefit analyses.
The data for the hypothetical Peru forest program comes from various official sources. For con-
sistency of computational base, we convert the price of timber from $/m3 into $/ha, by relying
on the IPCC Good Practice Guide LULUCF (IPCC (2003)). The price of timber and its long
term mean (φ) are obtained from the Peruvian market from the Annual Review and Assessment
of the World Timber Situation (ITTO, 2010). The State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2011
(Diaz et al., 2011) is the source we use for the identification of the REDD permit price and its
growth rate. The conversion of the deforested area into tons of carbon emitted is achieved with
the help of another converter (Ω), whose value for Peru can be found in the OSIRIS model for the
above and below ground biomass carbon and for soil carbon (OSIRIS). The discount rate used
for comparing profits over time is 6%, a classical value also employed by Engel et al. (2012). For
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the calibration of the cost of timber extraction, we adapt the cost function of Angelsen (1997),
calibrating it to data from Verissimo et al. (1992) for the Amazon rainforest.
Table 2.1: Model Calibration Parameters
Parameter Explanation Value Sensitivity Analysis Source
Pf (0) Timber price 500 $/m3 - ITTO (2010)
φ Timber growth rate (annual) 0.015 - ITTO (2010)
C $/m3 to $/ha 158 m3/ha - IPCC (2003)
Pr(0) REDD permit price (annual, in $/tCO2) 5 $/tCO2 Forest Trend (2011)
Pr(0) REDD permit price (annual, in $/m3) 21 $/m3 [1; 500] Forest Trend (2011)
α REDD permit price drift (annual) 0.04 - Forest Trend (2011)
σ REDD permit price vol. (annual) 0.1 [0; 0.3] Forest Trend (2011)
Ω ha to tC emitted 179 tC/ha - OSIRIS (v3.4)
ψ tC to tCO2 3.67 tC/tCO2 - Assante (2011)
δ Discount rate 0.06 [0; 0.1] -
d Deforestation Flow - [0; 5]
a1 Cost parameter 3.3198 $/ha - Angelsen (1997),
Verissimo et al. (1992)
a2 Cost parameter 798.0811$/ha - Angelsen (1997),
Verissimo et al. (1992)
ρ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 0.5 [0; 1] Chronopoulos et al. (2011)
λ Forest area under own. 200 - -
2.5 Results and Sensitivity Analysis
Based on the chosen parameters, a first important result is the forester’s optimal decision in a
risk neutral setting. When profits solely come from timber extraction under the specific discount
rate δ, growth rate of timber price φ and quadratic cost function c(d), the risk neutral forester
optimally cuts all his endowed area λ in a sequence of 5.5 years, each year with a deforested
area of d = 36.4 hectares. In this setting, the forester’s optimal decision implies no protection
for his forest, as he will never be incentivized to preserve it by entering into a REDD scheme.
This depends mainly on one factor, i.e., the deforestation rate d. The question then to be posed
is what his optimal choice would be in case he is forced to keep his deforestation rate within a
certain upper boundary, i.e. 1 hectare per year. This limitation make sense as it ensures that
the incentive to protect part of the forest is kept until the end of the investment period, which,
in our case, is 100 years. Results for this scenario can be seen in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Optimization Results, 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 , Risk Neutral Investor
Optimal Deforestation Flow (d¯) Optimal Investment Threshold (L¯) Expected First Passage Time (E[TL¯])
d = 1 155$/m3 year 57
Total Area Deforested REDD Revenues (Rˆ) Number of Permits Sold (Psold)
57 ha (28.5% of λ) 22,165$ 143 (1 per m3)
We can see that the forester still deforests at the maximum rate. However, in contrast to what
happens in the first scenario, he now has an incentive to participate in the REDD scheme. To
be more precise, he will enter it at year 57.
2.5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
How does the forester’s optimal choice change when risk increases, here denoted by the volatility
parameter σ? Intuitively, as risk increases, the forester will wait longer before entering the REDD
scheme. In other words, his optimal investment threshold increases. Figure 2.1 illustrates this
result which must be compared with initial REDD price Pr(0) of 21 $/m
3.
Figure 2.1: Optimal Investment Threshold L¯ vs. Volatility σ, for δ = 6%
Increasing the discount rate from 6% to 10% decreases the optimal investment threshold L¯,
consequently anticipating the entry time in the REDD program as well, as shown in Figure
2.2. This has interesting implications as a higher discount rate makes early entry into a REDD
project more profitable for the forester. As in the previous example, these results have to be
compared to an initial REDD price Pr(0) of 21 $/m
3.
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Figure 2.2: Optimal Investment Threshold L¯ vs. Volatility σ, for δ = 10%
An increase in the discount rate δ not only lowers the optimal investment threshold L¯, but also
the optimal deforestation rate d¯. While this may seem surprising, the fact that higher discount
rates imply lower future timber value causes the optimal REDD entry time to shift towards
earlier years. An additional effect is a decrease in the deforestation rate since less forest is cut
and more can be protected under REDD. These results are illustrated in Figure 2.3a and Figure
2.3b.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: Optimal Investment Threshold L¯ (Figure 2.3a) and Optimal Deforestation Rate d¯
(Figure 2.3b), plotted vs. Discount Rate δ
The effect of volatility on the expected first hitting time can be seen in Figure 2.4. In line with
traditional real options theory, the forester prefers to wait longer before committing to a REDD
scheme when volatility is high.
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Figure 2.4: Expected First Passage Time vs. Volatility σ, for δ = 6% and for δ = 10%
Volatility increases the optimal deforestation rate as well. Indeed, as risk increases the forester
prefers to deforest more and obtain higher profits from selling the timber given the higher
uncertainty about future REDD prices. This behaviour is derived from the fact that, by doing
so, he can enter into the REDD scheme with a good revenue base. While he might obtain higher
profits from REDD, the increased uncertainty makes him more cautious. This is shown in Figure
2.5.
Figure 2.5: Optimal Deforestation Rate d¯ vs. Volatility σ
2.5.2 A Risk Averse Forester
Introducing risk aversion partially changes the picture. Indeed, a risk averse forester enters the
REDD scheme at later dates compared to a risk neutral one. The reason is clear. As REDD
permits bear inside market and liquidity risk, a risk averse investor will want to wait longer and
obtain more information about the riskiness of the project before irreversibly committing to it.
Figure 2.6 illustrates this behaviour for a volatility of σ = 0.1 and a discount rate of δ = 10%.
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This result justifies the presence of intermediation in REDD markets. An intermediary, i.e. a
REDD manager, can provide the forester with a deterministic stream of payments in exchange
for forest protection, while bearing the risks of such markets. This would function as an incentive
for a risk averse forester to participate in a REDD scheme earlier, thus preserving more forest
from being cut.
Figure 2.6: Expected First Passage Time vs. Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion ρ
2.6 Conclusion
Implementing a Real Options Approach, we have been able to assess a forester’s investment
decision when choosing between deforesting or protecting his forest, committing his land to a
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) scheme. The choice
is important and has strong implications for the forester. Entering a REDD scheme is an
irreversible decision, that provides the forester with uncertain, stochastic, cash flows instead of
a certain, deterministic, revenue. In order to be as realistic as possible, our model takes into
consideration different risk profiles of the forester. Indeed, we test our model with a risk neutral
investor, and with a risk adverse investor.
Results show that the value of a risk neutral forester’s option to enter into a REDD scheme,
thereby protecting his forest from deforestation, but also renouncing the cash flow provided by
the sale of the timber, is maximized when the deforestation rate d is low. However, this is only
true when authorities oblige the forester to cut within certain deforestation boundaries. If such
boundaries are removed, the forester is incentivized to cut the entire forest within a few years.
Moreover, we find that lower discount rates postpone the decision to participate in a REDD
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scheme, while higher ones, as is the case in many developing countries, prove to be an incentive,
anticipating his optimal time to enter REDD. In fact, higher discount rates lead to a lower value
for cash flows in the future, causing the optimal REDD entry time to shift towards earlier years.
The introduction of risk aversion offers a more realistic perspective of the model and has the
following consequences: it postpones the optimal date at which the forester should enter the
REDD scheme and increases the annual optimal amount of timber to be cut, thus causing
additional deforestation. Our analytical findings are in line with the ones of Monge et al. (2016)
that examine in a stochastic setting the trade-off between risk and returns of a forester/farmer,
showing that, as risk aversion increases, a risk-averse farmer would trade off higher returns
for a more certain stream of income, which results in harvesting more forest more intensively.
We contribute by showing that as the risk aversion coefficient increases, not only is the timber
harvested more intensively, but the optimal entry time into a REDD project is increasingly
postponed as well.
Furthermore, we investigate the extent to which REDD price uncertainty influences the decision
to enter the scheme. Rising price volatility increases the optimal deforestation rate and postpones
optimal entry into the REDD scheme. Indeed, as price uncertainty increases, the forester prefers
to deforest more and obtain higher profits from selling the timber. This behaviour stems from
the fact that, by doing so, he can enter the REDD scheme with a good revenue base. While he
might obtain higher profits from REDD, the increased uncertainty makes him more cautious.
Moreover, lower discount rates postpone the decision to enter a REDD scheme, while higher
ones, as is the case in many developing countries, prove to be an incentive, anticipating his
optimal time to enter REDD.
These results justify the introduction of a REDD manager into the market, who would bear
the risks of a REDD permit market while providing the forester with a deterministic rent. In
this case, in fact, thanks to the presence of an intermediary in the market, the forester would
not face any risk and would again be incentivized to participate in the REDD scheme, therefore
saving his forest from deforestation. This behaviour serves as an indication for policymakers
on the importance of intermediation in such risky markets, as they have been struggling with
the design of a functioning market for REDD that provides its agents with the right incentives
to enter and trade while hedging their risks. This argumentation is supported by important
literature such as Blennow and Salinas (2006), who argue that managing risk aversion is a key
Chapter 3: Market Uncertainty and Risk Transfer in REDD Projects 24
success factor in REDD projects.
However, additional research is needed. In particular, different utility functions could be applied
to our model to test alternative forester preferences. In addition, interactions between the
forester and a REDD manager could be analysed in order to check for the existence of principal-
agent issues that may hinder the scheme from reaching its goals.
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Appendix A
The Hitting Time
TL = inf{t ≥ 0 : Pr(t) ≥ L} = inf{t ≥ 0 : Pr(0)e(α−σ
2
2
)t+σWt ≥ L} =
= inf{t ≥ 0 : e(α−σ
2
2
)t+σWt ≥ L
Pr(0)
} =
= inf{t ≥ 0 : γt+Wt ≥ 1
σ
ln
(
L
Pr(0)
)
} =
= inf{t ≥ 0 : Zt ≥ l} (A.1)
where γ =
(α−σ
2
2
)
σ
, l = 1
σ
ln
(
L
Pr(0)
)
and Zt = {γt + Wt, t ≥ 0} a Q−Brownian Motion,
drifted under the probability measure P.Troja (2016) Chesney et al. (2016)
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Expression 2.5
EP
[
Pr(TL) (λ− d · TL) e−δTL
]
= EP
[
λPr(TL)e
−δTL − d · TL · Pr(TL)e−δTL
]
= λ · EP [Pr(TL)e−δTL]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expression 2.5a
−d · EP [TL · Pr(TL)e−δTL]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expression 2.5b
(B.1)
B.1 Expression 2.5a
EP
[
Pr(TL)e
−δTL
]
= L · EP [e−δTL] = L ·
(
Pr(0)
L
)γ2
(B.2)
where:
γ2 =
−θ +√θ2 + 2δ
σ
, with θ =
α− σ2
2
σ
and α ≤ δ (B.3)
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B.2 Expression 2.5b
EP
[
TL · Pr(TL)e−δTL
]
= L · EP (TL · e−δTL) = L · ∂
∂δ
EP
(−e−δTL)
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[−∂
∂δ
(
Pr(0)
L
)γ2]
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(
Pr(0)
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ln
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L
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√
θ2 + 2δ
(B.4)
where:
γ2 =
−θ +√θ2 + 2δ
σ
, with θ =
α− σ2
2
σ
(B.5)
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Abstract Mitigation and adaptation represent two solutions to the issue of global warming.
While mitigation aims at reducing CO2 emissions and preventing climate change, adaptation
encompasses a broad scope of techniques used to reduce the impacts of climate change once
they have occurred. Both have direct costs on a country’s gross domestic product, but costs
also arise from temperature increases due to inaction. This paper introduces a tipping point in
a real options model and analyzes optimal investment choices in mitigation and their timing.
Keywords Adaptation ·Mitigation · Real options · Delay · Tipping point · Climate change ·
CO2 · Gross domestic product
1 Introduction
Climate change has become increasingly important in political discussions. The Intergovern-
mental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) has expressed strong concerns about the eventual
consequences for the planet and humanity if mean temperatures reach or increase above the
2 ◦C threshold. Since this temperature increase seems inevitable at this point, given the CO2
emission trend of past years, the IPCC is calling for rapid efforts to prevent further warming,
via mitigation, and to reduce the effects of already rising temperatures on natural and social
systems, via adaptation (IPCC 2014). Indeed, climate change has huge potential negative
effects. Lower food supplies, water shortages, droughts, and increased health problems are
among the consequences of high CO2 concentrations that negatively influence production
and consumption, which in turn impact current and future economic growth. The situation is
alreadymore critical than expected, and negative feedback effects are imminent (IPCC 2014).
B Pierre Lasserre
lasserre.pierre@uqam.ca
1 University of Zurich, IBF, Plattenstrasse 32, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland
2 Départment des sciences économiques, Université du Québec à Montréal, ESG, C.P. 8888,
Succursale A, Montreal, QC H3C 3P8, Canada
123
Published Manuscript: Mitigating Global Warming: A Real Options Approach 34
Ann Oper Res
Other potential effects are catastrophic, both in terms of system dynamics and in the common
meaning of the world. The potential collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation and its
effects on the lives of millions of people is a clear example of such abrupt changes (Huber
and Knutti 2012).
To take these potential effects into account, this article models the impact of climate
change and the possible occurrence of a catastrophic event on global welfare. The possibility
of catastrophic events is widely acknowledged in the literature, and their implications have
been investigated at both theoretical and empirical levels (see next section). Catastrophic
events occur when the state of the climate reaches a tipping point—the threshold—with
strong feedbacks that trigger one or several events. Such catastrophic events could include
the interruption of the thermohaline circulation, massive methane releases, or the melting
of ice caps causing a rise in sea level. In this paper, we define a catastrophic event as an
irreversible disruption having a dramatic negative impact on humanity. If the catastrophic
sequence of events is triggered, even a return to pre-industrial conditions will only allow the
ice caps or the methane sinks to reconstitute themselves over such a long period that their
loss may be considered irreversible for the purposes of human society. The change in climate
regime and the new conditions prevailing over the planet will thus be established irreversibly.
Although the human species would not be wiped out, the costs would be high enough -and
the subsequent conditions of human activity uncertain enough- that it is justified to model
this catastrophe as a long-lasting collapse of the gross domestic product (GDP) and as an
interruption of the dynamic optimization problem addressed by our model for the period
preceding the catastrophe. We assume that the climate state defining a tipping point can be
modelled as an atmospheric temperature threshold. Our paper further considers an aspect
neglected in climate and economic modelling: catastrophes are likely to be triggered only
if temperatures stay above some threshold for a certain time (Lenton et al. 2008). This time
window has to be given particular attention. Short periods above the temperature threshold
would not lead to any drastic departure from the continuous pattern of damage associatedwith
temperature while a long period above the threshold temperature would trigger a catastrophe.
The above assumptions imply that the catastrophe is certain not to happen in the immediate
future as long as temperature stays below some threshold level. However, the likelihood of
a catastrophe occurring within a given future period increases as temperature rises, since
the rise means that the threshold becomes more likely to be reached and also exceeded by
the process for the duration of the time window. Furthermore, a long-lasting business-as-
usual policy will lead to a catastrophe. Consequently, the decision maker must monitor the
temperature process and decidewhether or not to devote resources to slow down or reverse the
rise in temperature. This is themitigation decision.Mitigation has been studied in a number of
ways that we discuss briefly in the next section.Wemodel it as a once-and-for-all irreversible
decision to start spending some endogenous proportion of GDP on it after some optimally
chosen temperature level has been reached. This determines a reduction in emissions and
thus a modification of the temperature process, which is stochastic in our setting. While this
is a typical real options setup, its solution is not conventional and involves a methodological
contribution outlined in the text and precisely described in the “Appendix”.
Adaptation is different from mitigation. First mitigation is a pure global public good
while adaptation involves actions that are either private or whose public dimension is much
less pronounced. The decision by an individual to move to safer grounds is largely private.
Protective dikes are public goods, but only locally, and public institutions deal much better
locally than globally for the provision of public goods. With a climate treaty, for example,
free rider problems appear. For this reason, we treat adaptation as exogenously determined
within the model, without any intervention of the decision maker, while we treat mitigation
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as a planning decision. The decision maker optimizes mitigation for an economywhose GDP
already incorporates the consequences of decentralized adaptation.
The second important difference between adaptation and mitigation is that adaptation
does not affect the temperature process that determines climate. As a result, adaptation has
no effect on the probability of occurrence of a catastrophe. We further assume that, when
the catastrophe occurs, adaptation measures taken prior to the event are without effect on
the consequences of the catastrophe, which is that GDP equals zero as of this date. This is
because the damages are different in nature from those resulting from a progressive change
in climate and are also much more difficult to envisage. Consequently, we treat adaptation as
a decentralized activity affecting welfare before the possible climate catastrophe but without
any impact on its consequences. Given the path of GDP, net of the impact of adaptation, the
decision maker optimizes the additional welfare impact of mitigation while considering its
effect on the probability of climatic catastrophe.
The questions that our research is trying to answer are the following: (1)what is the optimal
percentage of GDP, net of adaptation expenditures, that a global decision maker should invest
in climate change mitigation efforts? (2) when should such investment start, i.e. what is the
optimal mean temperature that should trigger mitigation? (3) must mitigation expenditures
be higher than those for adaptation, or vice versa? And finally, (4) how do investments in
mitigation affect the probability of occurrence of the catastrophic event? We will provide
detailed answers to these questions in Sect. 5.
The article is structured as follows. The current state of the literature on GDP impacts of
climate change will be discussed in Sect. 2 while the model will be presented and explained
in detail in Sect. 3. Section 4 will present the dynamic optimization of the model, Sect. 5 will
show the numerical results obtained, and Section 6 will draw some conclusions.
2 Literature review
Anumber of issues on climate change are addressed in the economic literature. These include
the cost of climate change, the potential formitigation and adaptation, and the instruments that
must bemobilized aswell as the timing of action. The impacts are identified in terms of growth
in GDP, food supply, or the stock of man-made or natural capital. Empirical assessments
differ widely, but there is a broad consensus that impacts are unevenly distributed across
world regions.1 Another area of consensus is that climate change is an immense challenge
1 A huge literature investigating the economic impacts of climate change and the need for mitigation or
adaptation measures has focused on specific areas and sectors, in particular on agriculture and the future
availability of food supplies. Fischer et al. (2005) studied the interactions between climate change and dif-
ferent development paths. They suggest that climate change will worsen the gap between developed and less
developed countries. For Fischer et al. (2005), adaptation in agricultural techniques is the key to limiting the
impacts of climate change on crops. Rosenzweig and Parry (1994) showed that adaptation at a local-farm level
is insufficient. Action, in the form of mitigation, is needed at a global level. Similar conclusions were drawn
by Parry et al. (2004) who considered different socio-economic scenarios under the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Nakic´enovic´ and IPCC, Working Group III.
2000). While their results depend heavily on the effects of CO2 concentration on agriculture yields, which are
unknown, Parry et al. (2004) infer that the world will be nevertheless able to feed itself since the diminished
production in developing countries will probably be counterbalanced by an increased production in devel-
oped countries. However, this does not justify inaction; inequalities at regional and local levels may become
socially and economically devastating. Fankhauser (1997) estimated costs and benefits of climate change and
how these impact economies in the former Soviet Union, China, the United States of America, the European
Union, other OECD countries, and other non-OECD countries. He found that climate change is likely to cause
a loss of 1.5% of the world GDP.
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for economic institutions. First, and despite a tempering note by Battaglini et al. (2014), this
is because climate change is the biggest instance of the tragedy of the commons ever recorded
(Stern 2007; Stavins 2011). As such, it cannot be addressed without some interference with
the decentralized operation of markets. Second, climate change is the first instance of the
tragedy of the commons occurring at a truly global scale. It is not likely to be solved by
the methods that societies have developed at local and regional levels to deal with similar
problems at smaller scales. A theoretical literature initiated by Barrett (see, e.g., Barrett 2005,
2013) analyzes the difficulties involved in reaching international agreements in that context.
As a result, much of the literature is normative, and our paper also falls into this category.
A substantial part of the economic climate change literature consists of integrated
assessment models (IAM). Although some have the appearance of positive analyses, their
conclusions are invariably used to fuel debates over normative issues. Economic models of
climate change and their outcomes have been investigated by Nordhaus and Boyer (2003)
and Tol (2002a). Nordhaus and Boyer (2003) developed a model, called RICE for Regional
Integrated model of Climate and Economy, which is an improvement of the famous DICE
model (dynamic integrated model of climate and economy; (Nordhaus 1992).2
One of the most important studies about the effects of climate change on world GDP is
that of (Stern 2007). This author calculates the monetary impacts of inaction (or insufficient
action) on the global economy. Stern (2007) found that due to inaction, the world may lose up
to 5% of its aggregate GDP each year. If all the possible risks are taken into account, as in a
worst-case scenario, costs onworldGDP could add to 20%or evenmore. These costs are very
high compared to what the author calculated as the amount needed to combat climate change,
i.e., about 1% of world GDP if carbon has to be stabilized at around 550 ppm. Similar results,
though slightly less striking, are found in IEA (2006). A recent study by Fundacion DARA
Internacional and Climate Vulnerable Forum (2012) on the monetary impacts of climate
change on world GDP found that about 3.2% of world GDP by 2030 (or 1.2 trillion a year)
are at risk because of climate change and because of the inaction of governments around the
world. The Stern review relies on various information and methodologies, especially those
of IAMs.
IAMs have been harshly criticized for their lack of objectivity and transparency in policy
applications.3 Pindyck (2015) and others argue in favour of simple pedagogical models
able to enlighten decisions but that certainly must not be relied on for accurate answers. A
variety of models may claim to fall into that category. A brief review not only shows their
variety and richness, but helps identify and justify the climatic and economic features that
we choose to emphasize in this paper. Golosov et al. (2014) developed a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model that allows the identification of the optimal carbon tax,
2 The RICE model is able to predict the economic impacts of climate change in different regions. Like
other important literature, results show that developed regions would, on average, profit from an increase in
global mean temperatures, while the impact on developing countries would be the opposite. However, the
two effects are not of the same magnitude, since climate change affects the poorest areas with much more
devastating outcomes compared to what richer communities would experience. Tol (2002a) finds that the
impacts of changing climate on GDP are extremely model-dependent, since they can be positive, negative, or
non-existing according to how prices are taken into account. In general, however, it is evident how impacts
have different consequences depending on the country or group of countries under analysis, whether developed
(OECD, Middle East, China) or non OECD. Similar results were obtained by Tol (2002b), where dynamic
estimates were introduced.
3 Pindyck (2015) argues that “...Because the modeller has so much freedom in choosing functional forms,
parameter values, and other inputs, the model can be used to obtain almost any result one desires, and thereby
legitimize what is essentially a subjective opinion about climate policy.”
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or, equivalently, the marginal externality damage of emissions.4 Bretschger and Vinogradova
(2014) model an economy in which global warming causes stochastic climate shocks that
negatively impact the capital stock. They found an optimal flow of emission abatement that is
able to reduce climate shocks.5 Mitigation and adaptation represent the core of the analysis
by Bahn et al. (2012). These authors found that investments in mitigation highly depend
on the effectiveness of adaptation measures; effective adaptation may reduce or completely
suppress the need for mitigation.6
Pindyck (2015) claims that “what really matters [for the social cost of climate change]
is the likelihood and possible impact of a catastrophic climate outcome: a much larger-
than-expected temperature increase and/or a much larger-than-expected reduction in GDP
caused by even a moderate temperature increase. IAMs, however, simply cannot account for
catastrophic outcomes”. Prieur et al. (2011) and Amigues and Moreaux (2013) introduced a
threshold catastrophic temperature as the key element of an economic climate change model
where the catastrophe causes infinitely large damage. While they used a dynamic but non-
stochastic framework, Tsur and Zemel (2008) also consider the possibility of a catastrophic
climate event in a stochastic environment. However, the randomoccurrence of the catastrophe
is not directly linked to temperature or CO2 thresholds; it is governed by a Poisson law, where
the parameter increases with cumulative emissions. While they differ in their treatment of
uncertainty, the above papers highlight the importance of catastrophes.
In this paper, we model a climate catastrophe as an irreversible event of such magnitude
and with such manifestations that it amounts to the end of society as we knew it before the
catastrophe, with no basis to conceive of the ensuing area. We model this as calling an end
to the optimization period. Although this is by design an extreme representation of a climate
catastrophe, it is not without scientific basis. Dakos et al. (2008) and Lenton et al. (2008)
find that a deviation from a threshold temperature sustained over time is capable of inducing
dramatic changes to the environment. Lenton et al. (2008) identified several policy-relevant
tipping elements, i.e., events or climate states that could keep the temperature process above
a certain threshold for a long time window.
As a matter of fact, researchers differ widely in the way they have modelled catastrophes
and their consequences. Baranzini et al. (2003) model an environmental catastrophe incorpo-
rating negative jumps in the stochastic process corresponding to the net benefits associated
with abatement policies. Lemoine and Traeger (2014) investigated the welfare costs of a tip-
ping point, finding that a sufficiently high carbon tax is necessary to mitigate abrupt climate
shifts and that such a tax is capable of reducing peak temperatures by as much as 0.5 ◦C.
Following the set-up of Naevdal (2006), Naevdal and Oppenheimer (2007) deal with the trig-
ger of an environmental catastrophe, i.e., the interruption of thermohaline circulation, which
4 The authors find that the damage is proportional to the current GDP and that the degree of proportionality is
only dependent on the discount rate, on the elasticity of damage, and on the structure of carbon depreciation in
the atmosphere. Interestingly, important elements such as consumption, population dynamics, technological
paths, and CO2 concentration in the atmosphere have no influence on the damage caused by emissions. In
addition, they find that the optimal carbon tax should be higher than the median tax estimated by the literature.
5 The optimal flow spent on abatement exhibits a constant growth rate and is an increasing function of the
intensity of the environmental damage. They suggest that a world with uncertainty requires more stringent
climate policies that a world without.
6 However, if a catastrophe is to occur with some probability when a threshold temperature is reached and
its occurrence is not affected by adaptation but only by mitigation, then adaptation increases the probability
of such catastrophe as it takes resources away from mitigation. Prevention can also be suboptimal due to
uncertainty about the future (de Bruin and Dellink 2011). However, while preventive adaptation may include
strong delays before being effective, as happens with mitigation (Bahn et al. 2012), reactive adaptation reduces
uncertainty and delivers results more quickly, as pointed out by Parry et al. (2009).
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would occur if “the temperature or rate of temperature change exceed certain [unknown]
thresholds”. The authors distinguished two unknown thresholds that trigger the collapse
of thermohaline circulation. One is related to the rate of temperature increase and one is
related to the temperature level itself.7 Similarly, Keller et al. (2004) studied the effects of an
unknown threshold that causes the interruption of thermohaline circulation. These optimal
stopping models are similar in that respect to the real option model presented in this paper.8
Weitzman (2007) found the probability of crossing a threshold temperature level higher than
8 ◦C relative to pre-industrial level to be approximately 3–4%; the negative consequences of
such a catastrophe are impossible to appraise, whether qualitatively or in magnitude.
Our model is strongly inspired by the literature on tipping points triggering catastrophic
natural events. That is, the catastrophe is certain not to happen as long as the threshold is
not reached, in contrast to models where a catastrophe is possible with some probability
whatever the state (as when its occurrence obeys a Poisson law). Similar to Amigues and
Moreaux (2013), we model the catastrophe as a dramatic event of such magnitude that there
is no need or possibility to model—let alone manage—the post-catastrophe regime, as in
Lemoine and Traeger (2014) and the controlled IAMs that they discuss. We do so in a
stochastic environment. To avoid unrealistic outcomes, where the catastrophe occurs with
certainty as soon as a known threshold is reached, many authors have assumed that the
threshold is unknown, implying that learning about the threshold may occur, i.e., if some
state is reached and no catastrophe occurs, one knows that the threshold must be higher. The
economy is then safe if it remains at or below the state already reached.
The setting in this paper differs in that the (temperature) threshold is assumed to be known,
but the catastrophe occurs only if enough time passes above that threshold. Since the process
is stochastic, the catastrophe is uncertain even when the threshold is exceeded, but society
is obviously taking risks if it allows that to happen. We believe that this is a more realistic
way to model the scientific evidence described in Lenton et al. (2008) than assuming that
the catastrophe is certain once the threshold is reached. Global temperature levels are a good
example, since a prolonged period above a certain temperature level is needed for a natural
catastrophe such as the interruption of thermohaline circulation or melting of the Western
Antarctic Ice Sheet to occur.
Perhaps the most important characteristic that distinguishes economic from other climate
models is when the former seek to optimize some policy variable.9 In that respect, remarks
such as those of Weyant (2008) about the Stern review—that climate policy should not
be taken as a deterministic “one shot” benefit-cost analysis but as a problem of sequential
decision-making under uncertainty- are to be taken seriously. Nonetheless, “one shot”, or
7 Naevdal and Oppenheimer (2007) found that the upper boundary of the rate of temperature increase is
crossed in finite time while the upper boundary of the temperature process is crossed only as time goes to
infinity.
8 The authors found that increased uncertainty does not increase optimal abatement. The reason can be found
in one (or both) of these conditions: (a) risk aversion is not the dominant nonlinearity in their model and (b)
increased uncertainty does not decrease the variance of the per capita consumption. Thus, characteristics of
the threshold and the learning process have a strong influence on the optimal abatement policy in the near-
term. Similar results in a setting with an unknown (but reversible) catastrophic threshold are also analyzed by
Brozovic´ and Schlenker (2011), who found a non-monotonic relationship between precautionary behaviour
and uncertainty. Higher uncertainty surrounding the natural system usually increases precautionary behaviour.
However, when the risk becomes large enough, the behaviour of the decisionmaker becomes less precautionary
because “precautionary reductions in pollutant will be too costly compared to the negligible expected reduction
in the probability that the threshold is crossed”.
9 Examples are the optimal carbon tax in the stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model of Golosov et al.
(2014), the model with tipping points of Lemoine and Traeger (2014), or the optimal flow of carbon abatement
in Bretschger and Vinogradova (2014).
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infrequent, decisions on policy variables are the rule more often than the exception in climate
policy. The real option approach deals with such timing decisions.
In finance, an option is a title that gives its owner the right, but not the obligation, to buy
(in the case of a call option), or to sell (a put option) another financial title such as a stock.
If and when the option is exercised, there is no return to the previous situation. A real option
involves a similar decision (in the case of a call option, buy irreversibly, or abstain from
buying), except that the decision applies to a ’real’ thing rather than to financial paper. For
example the owner of a project such as a road may exercise the option to build the road by
spending resources to that end; once the resources have been committed, there is no return
or ’deconstruction’ of the road. For many such projects, there is an optimal time to undertake
them, to exercise the option.
The environmental real option approach is based on the premise that, and applies when,
environmental policies involve committing resources for the long term and are irreversible
due to institutional and other constraints. Under such conditions, environmental policies
are best modelled as once-and-for-all (or long-term) decisions (Pindyck 2000; Insley 2002;
Kassar and Lasserre 2004) whose timing must be chosen. This is perhaps most obvious if we
think that climate problems may have to be solved by treaties (Barrett 2013). In such cases,
and many others, environmental policy decisions are costly to reach and to characterize,
so they take the form of a once and for all policy decision that is irreversible and requires
dedicated resources, whether they are dollars or political capital. These “one shot” decisions
could be compared to the results of the COP 21 in Paris in December 2015. In the current
model, instead of fixing an objective in terms of temperature increase until the end of the
century, the central planner decides when and how much to invest. The timing of the policy
and the magnitude of the engagement must be chosen optimally.
Real option models are particularly well adapted to such optimal stopping problems. They
are used in order to check whether or not investment decisions should be taken. The standard
tool used in this setting before real options were introduced is the Net Present Value (NPV in
what follows) approach according to which, an investment should be realized if and only if its
NPV, i.e. the difference between its expected discounted payoffs and costs, is positive. This
latter criteria is static to the extent to which the choice is between realizing the investment at
the date when the NPV is calculated, or never.
This is a significant drawback of the NPV criterion. If investment opportunities are consid-
ered as real options, the investor has the right, and not the obligation, to make an investment
during a given period of time. When identifying the optimal investment date, the possibility
of postponing the investment is taken into account. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an
excellent reference. Usually, the timing of the investment is the objective of these models.
In this paper, not only the timing of the investment in mitigation is obtained, but also the
optimal amount to be invested.
In fact the concept of option value was introduced in environmental economics before the
appearance of real options (Arrow and Fisher 1974; Henry 1974; Fisher and Krutilla 1975). It
stresses that making an irreversible action at one point in time involves the cost of renouncing
the flexibility to wait; if this cost is correctly taken into account in a cost benefit analysis
the benefits from the decision must be higher than in a traditional cost benefit analysis for
the action to be economically justified. In terms of a climate change decision, if the benefits
from curbing emissions are higher, the higher the temperature reached by the planet, then
the irreversibility of the decision to control emissions would raise the temperature threshold
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at which the decision to curb emissions is implemented. Moreover, this threshold would be
higher, the more volatile the temperature process.10
However, the ’traditional’ view that the relationship between volatility and threshold is
monotonic has been challenged. As described by Pindyck (2000), real option decisions may
involve two kinds of irreversibilities that work in opposite directions. First, an environmental
policy imposes sunk costs on society, and political constraints may make the policy itself
difficult to reverse. Second, environmental damage can be partially or totally irreversible. For
example, increases in GHG concentrations are long lasting, and the damage to ecosystems
from higher global temperatures can be permanent. In other words, while there is a direct
cost of exercising the option which can be avoided by postponing the exercise, there is also
a cost incurred while waiting. Thus, adopting a policy now rather than waiting has a sunk
benefit -a negative opportunity cost- that biases traditional cost-benefit analysis against policy
adoption.
Our model examines a similar trade-off. We assume that the decision maker knows the
tipping point temperature and that he has to make an optimal decision, in terms of when
to invest in mitigation, by choosing an optimal temperature threshold, and in terms of how
much to invest, by choosing an optimal fraction of GDP to devote to mitigation.
3 The model
The average global surface temperature (Hasselmann 1976; Kaerner 1996; Lawrence and
Ruzmaikin 1998; Eby et al. 2009, 2012) and world GDP dynamics (Brock and Mirman
1972) can be respectively modelled by a time component plus a random part, driven by white
noise and a volatility parameter, i.e.,
dCt =
{
adt + βdWt for t < TL +T (k, L)
a(k)dt + βdWt else
(1)
and
dVt
Vt
= μdt + σd Bt (2)
where {Wt , t ≥ 0} and {Bt , t ≥ 0} are two independent Brownian motions11 under the
physical probability P and where the drift parameters, a and μ, and the volatility parameters,
β and σ , are constant and positive. In particular, a > 0, the drift of the temperature process,
explicitly models the global warming effect we are experiencing today. We will also assume
that the discount rate r is constant and positive. It is worthwhile mentioning that there is no
guarantee that the temperature processC will remain positive with probability one. However,
given our initial set of parameters, it is highly likely. TheGDPprocess V , expressed in dollars,
is by definition positive.
The temperature process evolves in two phases, a “before mitigation” and an “after mit-
igation” phase beginning at time TL , as soon as the threshold L is reached. The impact of
such a mitigation strategy on the temperature process will start with a delay, i.e. , at time
TL +T (k, L). There is also an autonomous GDP process and a net GDP process; the latter
is a function of both temperature excess from the pre-industrial temperature, CP = 14 ◦C
10 On the effect of volatility on threshold values in basic real option models, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
especially chapters 1 and 5.
11 In an arithmetic Brownian motion setting, the drift a and the volatility β are both expressed in degrees
Celsius.
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and the autonomous GDP process Vt . To be more specific, climate change causes a flow of
day-to-day costs over time, and these costs can be viewed as levies from GDP as time goes
by. Human adaptation efforts can reduce their immediate impacts to some extent, but not
suppress them. Consequently, we introduce the disposable GDP, DG D Pt , as the GDP, Vt ,
net of the day-to-day costs of climate change as moderated by adaptation efforts:
DG D Pt = Vt e−ρ|Ct−CP | (3)
where CP = 14 ◦C describes the global average temperature level prior to industrialization,
in the absence of man-made pollution, and where ρ > 0 is a parameter reflecting the impact
of the temperature gap and its measurement units. Note that this functional form implies
strong convexity with respect to Ct −CP , meaning that the effect of inaction is accentuated
if the temperature process C and the temperature level prior to industrialization,CP , diverge.
The higher the difference between Ct and CP , the more accentuated its impact on adaptation
costs and therefore on the disposable GDP.
A global environmental catastrophe will occur if the temperature remains without inter-
ruption above a given temperature level L1 over a period of D units of time. This specification
finds its justification in a vast literature on tipping points and abrupt climate change, which is
reviewed with a focus on policy implications by Lenton et al. (2008). Abrupt climate change
occurs “when the climate system is forced to cross some threshold, triggering a transition
to a new state at a rate determined by the climate system itself and faster than the cause”
(p. 1786). In fact, deviations above the tipping point L1, sustained over time (for D units
of time), are capable of creating serious negative effects on the environment. According to
Hansen et al. (2008),
Paleoclimate data and ongoing global changes indicate that ‘slow’ climate feedback
processes not included in most climate models, such as ice sheet disintegration, vege-
tation migration, and GHG release from soils, tundra or ocean sediments, may begin
to come into play on time scales as short as centuries or less. (p. 217)
Indeed, as these authors argue, if the overshoot of the appropriate long-run CO2 target is not
brief, there is a high probability of seeding irreversible catastrophic effects.12 The catastrophe
will therefore not occur the first time that the temperature reaches the critical level L1, but
only if it remains above this critical level without interruption for a given period of time. The
full impact of global warming on possible climate catastrophes therefore requires a given
time window. As soon as the catastrophe occurs, the GDP is approximated by zero and is
assumed to remain at this level as of this date. This is a specific feature of this model as
compared with others. The real options setting allows the joint determination of the optimal
temperature level L∗ at whichmitigation should start to be implemented and the optimal level
k∗ of this investment. Optimality means that these two values are endogenously specified in
order to maximize the expected sum of discounted GDPs between the current time and the
date of the catastrophe.13
12 Hansen et al. (2008) argue that ’If humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization
developed and to which life on Earth is adapted, paleoclimate evidence and ongoing climate change suggest
that CO2 will need to be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm.(...) If the present overshoot
of this target CO2 is not brief, there is a possibility of seeding irreversible catastrophic effects.’ While the
target of 350 ppm is low when compared with other targets that are considered reasonable, in particular some
proposed by the IPCC, the idea that a long overshoot will trigger a catastrophe that might have not occurred
with a brief incursion in the non-sustainable zone, appears very reasonable.
13 Similar situations have been studied in finance with Parisian options; the delay is called Parisian time. For
the mathematical specification of Parisian time and other variables, please refer to “Appendix 1”.
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3.1 Adaptation and mitigation
Adaptation is modelled as the magnitude of the adjustment in GDP implied by the constant ρ
in Eq. (3). The higher ρ the bigger the net day-to-day impact of climate change on disposable
GDP. A value of ρ = 0 means that there is no impact of temperature change on GDP, hence
no adaptation efforts, so that DG D Pt = Vt . When ρ is strictly positive, disposable GDP
would depart from Vt as the temperature gap Ct − CP rises. As temperature increases, an
increasing proportion of GDP is lost to the day-to-day costs of climate change.
Adaptation efforts range from entirely private (changing residence) to partially public
(building levies for local protection), as opposed to mitigation, which is a pure public good at
the global scale. It is thus reasonable to assume that ρ is determined by market mechanisms
and local institutions that function efficiently, whereasmitigation decisions have to be studied
as a decision maker’s problem. Adaptation efforts have no effect on climate dynamics, they
only affect the way current temperature translates into current disposable GDP, and they only
do so while climate dynamics remain in the current climate regime. If temperature rises to
such a level that the climate dynamic system undergoes some catastrophic change, previous
adaptation efforts will not have any impact on the magnitude of the catastrophe.
Mitigation is modelled via two endogenous variables: first the flow of investment k, mea-
sured as a proportion of GDP, aiming at decreasing the drift of the temperature process (1);
second the optimal date TL
14 at whichmitigation expenditures are introduced. An entity, such
as an international organization, chooses to devote a proportion ke−δ(s−TL ), with s ≥ TL ,
of world disposable GDP to activities or measures that reduce the rate of increase of the
temperature process relative to some business-as-usual trajectory. This proportion may be
constant if δ = 0 or, if δ > 0, it diminishes exponentially from its maximum k that occurs at
the date TL on which the mitigation decision is taken. When δ < 0, then too much time has
passed with inaction, and a mitigation effort increasing over time is needed.
Given the difficulties surrounding the mitigation decision process, the decision to slow
down the process driving climate change should be viewed as being reached very rarely -we
assume once at most- and as irreversible. For example, it may be interpreted in the model as
a treaty whose features would be respected once the treaty is signed, although there might
be a delay until these features are fully implemented and a delay until their effect is felt. For
example, consider a decision that is implemented when the global temperature reaches some
endogenous threshold level L , at date TL . If a fraction ke
−δ(t−TL ) is spent for mitigation as of
TL , then the temperature process will be modified only after a given delayT (k, L), i.e., the
trend of the temperature will be set to a(k) instead of remaining at a at time TL +T (k, L).
The delay is defined as
T (k, L) = θ
VTL e
−ρ(L−CP )k
(4)
where TL represents the date at which the decision to mitigate is taken, i.e., the first passage
time of the temperature process at level L , and θ is a parameter that models the delay mag-
nitude, which can be influenced by chemical and atmospheric factors, and also by elements
such as type of mitigation, whose choice is not modelled here.
The delay T (k, L) takes into account the fact that the higher the starting disposable
GDP available for expenditures in mitigation and the higher the fraction of disposable GDP
actually spent, k, the quicker the effect on the temperature process. In addition, the wider
the temperature gap L − CP at the time the mitigation decision is implemented, the longer
14 As shown later, TL is the random time at which the temperature process reaches a predetermined level L ,
which triggers the flow of investments k in mitigation.
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the delay because the day-to-day costs of climate change, despite adaptation efforts, use
up a portion of the disposable income otherwise available for mitigation. The function of
T (k, L) finds its rationale in important scientific literature (Friedlingstein et al. 2011),
which showed that, despite a sudden drop in carbon emissions and due to strong inertia, it
still takes (much) time for the temperature process to stabilize and eventually start decreasing.
For additional information, please refer to “Appendix 4”.
In addition to the delay required for mitigation expenditures to become effective, their
initial size k, as a proportion of disposable capital, determines their impact on the temperature
trend, which they reduce from a to a (k) according to the formula15
a(k) = a − (a − η) k
α
(5)
with
lim
k→α
a(k) = η (6)
where η is a negative constant reflecting the self-regenerating capacity of the atmosphere,
expressed here in terms of its effect on the temperature process; its determination will be
described shortly.
Equation 6 indicates that when mitigation efforts are set to a proportion k = α ≤ 1 of
DG D P , then the drift of the temperature process reaches η so that anthropogenic effects
are eliminated and the self-regenerating capacity of the atmosphere becomes the sole non-
stochastic factor affecting temperature changes. In other words, α ·100% of the GDP should
be spent in order to eliminate these anthropogenic effects. Note that in this model, an k =
a/(a − η) < α is required in order to stabilize the temperature level (a(k) = 0). While an
α = 1 corresponds to a pessimistic scenario, it is an indisputable ceiling that corresponds to
our choice in this paper. Obviously, a smaller value of α could be used in our model. We will
illustrate this possibility in Sect. 4.
Equation 5 can be rationalized as follows. Assume that Eq. 1 is an approximation of
dCt = (ηCt + f (N )+ f (Et )) dt + βdWt (7)
where f (·) represents a function that models the impacts of natural emissions N and of
anthropogenic emissions Et on the temperature process per unit of time, and ηCt is the drop
in temperature induced by the gross (before emissions) self regeneration of the atmosphere,
when temperature is Ct ; η is a negative parameter to be determined. f (N ) is assumed to
remain constant over the industrial period while f (Et ) is null at the beginning of industri-
alization and positive thereafter. It is assumed that the drift of the temperature process was
zero before the industrial period, since natural emissions on average offset self regeneration;
hence
f (N ) = −ηCP (8)
where CP = 14.0 ◦C represents the average global pre-industrial temperature. Substituting
into Eq. (7) yields:
dCt = (η (Ct − CP )+ f (Et )) dt + βdWt . (9)
Since η < 0, Eq. (9) models the dynamics of a mean reverting process. In particular, if
Ct = CP , the drift reduces to f (Et ).
15 Since a is independent of δ at this stage, we will write a(k) instead of a of a(k, δ).
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In this paper, Eq. (1) is used instead of the complex Eq. (9) to model the temperature
process. The drift a corresponds to:
a ∼= η (C0 − CP )+ f (E0). (10)
The negative parameter η may be approximated as follows. The self-regenerating capacity
of the atmosphere is often defined as the natural rate of resorption of the CO2 stock (Hansen
et al. 2008; Archer et al. 2009); estimates vary widely. The assumption that the natural rate of
resorption of theC O2 stock is constant and that 25% of emitted CO2 is still in the atmosphere
after two centuries (Friedlingstein et al. 2011) implies a decay rate of 0.1% per year. In terms
of temperature process, we recall that the atmosphere was in stationary equilibrium at a tem-
perature of CP = 14.0 ◦C during the pre-industrial period. Suppose that this equilibrium is
disturbed by the sudden emission of a quantity of carbon that instantaneously raises temper-
atures by one degree. That carbon will still be in the atmosphere after two centuries, so that
the gap in temperature away from the stationary equilibrium will vanish at the rate of 0.1%
per year because of the natural decay of CO2. Thus the influence of natural carbon decay on
temperature is 0.001 (Ct − CP ) and
η = −0.1%. (11)
At dates before TL + T (k, L), the dynamics of the temperature process are given by (1).
By spending a proportion ke−δ(t−TL ) of disposable GDP, as of TL it is possible to reduce
anthropogenic emissions, thus reducing the drift of the temperature process from a to a (k)
as of TL +T (k, L). Although it is theoretically possible to achieve negative emissions by
carbon sequestration techniques, we assume that the maximum possible reduction, obtained
by starting with a proportion k = α at TL , is to reduce anthropogenic emissions to zero, as
in the pre-industrial state. On the other hand, if k = 0, nothing is changed, so a (0) = a.
Equation 5 expresses this relationship.
Thus, the choice of the fraction k affects both the new drift and the delay until the new drift
applies. Since a substantial portion of mitigation expenditures takes the form of investments
into R&D and technologies for mitigation, we may think of the proportion ke−δ(s−TL ) of
disposable GDP set aside for mitigation as ensuring that the capital necessary to maintain
the temperature drift a (k) is built up and maintained. This may require higher initial efforts,
followed but a somewhat reduced capital maintenance effort. This possibility is crudely
modelled by parameter δ, as explained earlier.
The associated drift of Ct thus changes at the endogenous time TL + T (k, L), from a
to a(k). The temperature process’ dynamics thus change from Eq. (1) to
dCˆt = a(k)dt + βdWt , for t ≥ TL +T (k, L) (12)
To this will correspond a new disposable GDP
D̂G D Pt = Vt e−ρ|Cˆt−CP |, for t ≥ TL +T (k, L) (13)
which has the same form as the disposable GDP described in Eq. (3), but which is now a
function of a temperature process Ct with a different drift.
Let us note TL as the first passage time of the temperature at a level L that triggers the
decision to use the budget k allocated with the mitigation
TL = inf{t ≥ 0 : Ct ≥ L} = inf{t ≥ 0 : Z t ≥ l}.
with {Z t = γ t + Wt , t ≥ 0} a drifted P−Brownian Motion, l = L−C0β and γ = aβ .
The mitigation budget Vse
−ρ(Cs−CP )ke−δ(s−TL ) will be spent as a continuous flow from TL
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to the date of the catastrophe, denoted H+L1,D . This is the first time that the temperature
process remains without interruption above the temperature level L1 for D units of time. Its
mathematical definition is given in “Appendix 1”.
3.2 The objective function
We are taking the point of view of a global decision maker who maximizes the discounted
cumulative future disposable GDP over the next T = 500 years by choosing two variables.
He selects a threshold temperature L that triggers the beginning of the mitigation investment
period;16 he also determines the magnitude of the investment by choosing the proportion k
of disposable GDP devoted to mitigation from the beginning of the mitigation period. The
decision to undertake mitigation causes the drift of the temperature process to drop from its
historical level a to a lower level a (k) after a delay T (k, L). The choices of L and k have
no effect on the tipping level L1; however, they affect the date at which L1 may be reached
as well as the probability of a catastrophe, i.e., the probability that temperature stays above
L1 continuously for at least D years.
Let us now consider the following cases for L .
1. L < L1—i.e., the endogenous threshold L which triggers the investment in mitigation,
is lower than the exogenous threshold L1 that may trigger catastrophic events. As long as
TL , the first passage time of temperature at a level L , is smaller than the horizon T , he will
invest a fraction k of his budget inmitigation at timeTL , causing the temperature process to
lower its drift. The decrease in the drift does not happen immediately after the investment
is made, but is subject to a time delay equal toT (k, L). After TL +T (k, L)17, and if
the temperature process has not yet reached the tipping point level L1, the temperature
process is then both less likely to reach L1 and less likely to stay above L1 for a long
period of time than in the absence of the mitigation decision. Here, two different things
can happen. In fact, it can be that TL +T (k, L) is small enough to avoid a catastrophe
(Case Ia). Figure 1a illustrates this situation, i.e., the one in which the investment in
mitigation has been promptly made. This has caused a decrease in the temperature drift
already at early stages, thus avoiding the catastrophe. Conversely, it could happen (Case
Ib) that the time TL +T (k, L) is not small enough to avoid a catastrophe, as illustrated
by Fig. 1b.
2. L > L1—i.e., the endogenous threshold L which triggers the investment in mitigation, is
higher than the exogenous threshold L1 that may trigger catastrophic events. If the global
decision maker decides to invest at a temperature higher than the level L1 that triggers the
catastrophe, he faces two possible situations. In the first one (Case IIa), it could happen
that L , the threshold temperature that triggers an investment k in mitigation, is reached
before a possible catastrophe. If this happens, then the global decisionmaker finds himself
in a situation similar to Case I, where mitigation expenditures may still be sufficient to
avoid the catastrophe before time T , through a timely decrease in temperatures; however,
the reduction in drift will need to drive the temperature process below L1 before D units
of time are spent consecutively above the threshold, which is of course less likely than
if the threshold had not been reached in the first place, as in Cases Ia and Ib. It can also
happen (Case IIb) that D units of time are spent continuously above the catastrophe level
16 The choice of a determinate optimal temperature level determines the optimal time at which the mitigation
policy should be implemented; however that time remains random because the date at which any given
temperature is reached is random.
17 Note that time TL +T (k, L) might be shorter or longer than time TL1 .
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Fig. 1 Simulation of one path. The green line represents the level L at which the global social decision maker
starts investing in mitigation. The solid red line represents the level L1, which is the temperature above which
the catastrophe can be triggered, if the process stays continuously above L1 for a period of time at least equal
to D
L1. In this case, even if a mitigation procedure is brought forward, the environmental
catastrophe occurs in a finite period. These two possibilities are illustrated in Fig. 1c, d.
The four different cases pictured in Fig. 1 imply different formulations of the objec-
tive function presented below. The global decision maker determines an optimal investment
threshold L∗ and an optimal investment fraction k∗ such that the expected discounted sum of
the future disposable GDP is maximized. In order to do so, he has to find the supremum, over
L and k, of a function f (·, ·). Because the horizon can be considered infinite, it is known in
the options literature that the optimal trigger level L∗ is constant (Merton 1973; Carr et al.
1992; Chesney and Jeanblanc 2004).
The maximization problem simplifies to
sup
k,L
f (k, L)⇔ sup
k,L
[
1L<L1 · g1(k, L)+ 1L≥L1 · g2(k, L)
]
(14)
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with:
g1(k, L) = EP
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
∫ TL∧T
0
DG D Pue
−rudu︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1a
+
∫ TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
TL∧T
DG D Pu
(
1− ke−δu) e−rudu︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1b
+
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
D̂G D Pu
(
1− ke−δu) e−rudu
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1c
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (15)
and
g2(k, L) = EP
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
∫ TL∧H+L1,D∧T
0
DG D Pue
−rudu︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2a
+
∫ TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
TL∧H+L1,D∧T
DG D Pu
(
1− ke−δu) e−rudu
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2b
+
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
D̂G D Pu
(
1− ke−δu) e−rudu
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2c
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (16)
This is a generalized optimal stopping problemwith two stochastic processes, one associated
with the temperature process and one associatedwith theGDP process. As alreadymentioned
the choice of optimal stopping rather than optimal control as methodology for addressing the
climate change problem is due to the irreversibility of the investment decision intomitigation.
Assuming that control variables are chosen at each period, as in stochastic control problems,
is simply not realistic in the climate change framework.
We also argued that real option models are particularly well adapted to optimal stopping
problems. They are used in order to check whether or not investment decisions should be
taken; the price at which they should be taken is called the strike price. In the real options
model presented here, what plays the role of the strike price are the integrals (preceded by
a minus sign) in the terms labelled I1b, I1c, I2b, and I2c of Expressions 15 and 16. They
correspond to mitigation costs.
The integral bounds in Expressions 15 and 16 are in most cases stopping times of the
temperature processC and the functions to be integrated involve the two stochastic processes,
C and V , that determine both welfare before a possible catastrophe, and the likelihood of
that catastrophe.
The objective function can be intuitively interpreted in the following way:
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• If L < L1, i.e. if the endogenous threshold L which triggers the investment in mitigation
is lower than the exogenous tipping level L1 that may trigger catastrophic events:
1a. Integral I1a computes the expected discounted sum of future disposable GDPs from
the initial date until time TL , when the decision to invest in mitigation is taken by the
global social decision maker, or until time T = 500 years, whichever comes first;
1b. From time TL until time TL + T (k, L), without catastrophe in the meantime, an
investment for mitigation has been made, but it is still too early for the drift of the
temperature process to shift down. This will happen only at time TL +T (k, L) and
if the catastrophe has not occurred. The expected discounted sum of future disposable
GDPs is reduced by the fraction k invested in mitigation (Integral I1b);
1c. From time TL +T (k, L), until time H+L1,D when the catastrophe happens, or until
time T , the drift of the temperature process is lower. If H+L1,D is higher than T ,
Integral I1c computes the expected discounted sum of future disposable GDPs until
time T = 500 years; if the temperature process stays above L1 for at least D years
without interruption then the catastrophe occurs and future GDPs becomes null as of
H+L1,D .
• If L > L1, i.e., if the threshold that triggers the investment in mitigation is higher than
the exogenous tipping level L1 that may trigger catastrophic events:
2a Integral I2a represents the cumulative GDP from the initial date until whichever time
happens first: a) time TL , when the decision to invest is taken, b) H
+
L1,D
, when the
catastrophic event happens, or c) T = 500 years. If either b or c is the case, then all
the following integrals are zero, since no investment in mitigation (Integral I2b) or
change in temperature drift (Integral I2c) occurs.
2b IfTL occurs later than H
+
L1,D
, Integral I2b is zero.Otherwise, this integral corresponds
to I1b.
2c Integral I2c computes the expected discounted sum of future disposable GDPs during
the period of time that goes from TL + T (k, L) to H+L1,D , the time when the
catastrophe occurs, or to T . Integral I2c is strictly positive when H
+
L1,D
is greater
than TL +T (k, L) and zero otherwise.
The formulation chosen to represent the second part of the objective function allows us to
set Integral I2c equal to zero if H
+
L1,D
is reached after TL , but before TL +T (k, L). When
H+L1,D < T = 500 is smaller than TL , this formulation assigns zero values to both Integral
I2b and Integral I2c.
From a mathematical point of view, by referring to Section 2.1 of Peskir and Shiryaev
(2006), it can be stated that the problem is well-defined and well-posed. Indeed, as shown
in “Appendix 2”, the expectation of the supremum over time of the profits associated to the
real option’s exercise is bounded.
If the horizon is finite, as it is the case when the model is implemented, then depending on
the parameters, the stopping time might exist. If it exists, it will by construction be smaller
than horizon T. If it does not exist, it means that the central planner will finally decide that
it is not optimal to start a mitigation policy. For example, if the discount rate is too high the
decision maker might delay this investment and then notice that it is too late in any case. This
case is not ex-ante excluded in the model and is a possible result.
If the horizon is infinite, depending on the parameters, a solution might exist, as in the
previous case. If the stopping time exists, then the issue of its unicity is resolved as follows.
The first stopping time will be selected. The logic of the model is as follows. At current
123
49 Published Manuscript: Mitigating Global Warming: A Real Options Approach
Ann Oper Res
time t , there are two possibilities. Either the optimal stopping time has been reached and the
mitigation policy should be implemented without delay, or otherwise the model should be
subsequently used as long as the stopping time has not been reached. If it is reached in a
finite time, then the investment should start at that date and the optimal GDP percentage k∗
to be invested is the one defined at this same date.
As shown empirically in Fig. 9a, b in “Appendix 3”, in the specific case where the temper-
ature process is deterministic, the function to be maximized behaves quite nicely and exhibits
a unique maximum for the optimal temperature level at which the mitigation strategy should
be implemented L∗, and for the optimal amount to be invested k∗.
If the stopping time is never reached it means that it is infinite and the mitigation policy
will never be implemented. If at initial time t , with the current set of parameters, it is not
optimal to implement the mitigation policy, the question of the existence of the stopping time
remains open. It might occur at a finite time in the future, or be infinite.
4 Calibration and numerical results
The starting point of the numerical simulations is the year 2011, andC0 = 14.8 ◦C(287.95◦K)
is considered as the baseline temperature. The time horizon chosen is T = 500 years, with
timestepst of 1year. Parameter values for the Monte Carlo simulation are given in Table 1
and are discussed below.
The catastrophe threshold L1 was chosen as 19
◦C, a temperature at which environmental
events that could reshape the livability of Earth, such as the interruption of the thermohaline
circulation (Bahn et al. 2011; Lenton et al. 2008), can happen with positive probability.
These values are in line with IPCC (2013), which estimated a possible temperature increase
in the range 1.1–6.4 ◦C. It has also been taken into account that temperature shows strong
inertia (see Chen et al. 2011). For this reason, the catastrophe threshold has been rounded
up to 5 ◦C18 above the pre-industrial temperature CP . That threshold is also justified by the
uncertainty surrounding the volatility of the temperature process. Indeed, Weitzman (2007)
argued that the probability of temperatures exceeding the interval estimated by IPCC (2013)
is not negligible, so catastrophe is a definite possibility.With respect to the percentage ofGDP
invested in mitigation and in adaptation, numerical results show that mitigation expenditures
should be higher than adaptation expenditures (Table 2). This might be far different from
what actually happens.19 The parameters for the Monte Carlo simulation are presented in
Table 1.
The drift a of the temperature process is positive, given global warming, but very small.
The rate chosen is a = 0.035. Despite the fact that global temperature increased by 0.8–
1.0◦C during the last century, the future is very uncertain given current carbon emissions
and polluting trends. The parameter chosen thus corresponds to the lower, conservative, limit
of the possible temperature increase in the next 100years (Lenton et al. 2008), and also to
18 While IPCC (2013) considers that such a temperature increase may occur before the end of the twenty-
first century, scientific evidence and opinions about climate sensitivity and temperature processes are very
heterogeneous.
19 Indeed, due to the uncertainty involved, countries might prefer to invest in adaptation rather than in
mitigation. Said differently, mitigation techniques, at least at the moment, are much slower than adaptation
techniques for reaching the desired goals. Governments are also concerned with the problem of free riding,
which accompanies many mitigation efforts. This point must be stressed. The local characterization of many
adaptation projects reduces the issue of free riding, and it represents an additional reason why adaptation is
preferred.
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Table 1 Model parameters
Parameter Description Value Sensitivity
CP Pre-industrial global average
temperature level
14.0 ◦C –
C0 2011 global average temperature
level
14.8 ◦C –
k∗ Optimal mitigation investment
fraction
– (0–10%)
L∗ Optimal investment threshold – (14–22)
L1 Catastrophe threshold 19 –
μ Initial drift of the GDP process 3.0% –
σ Volatility of the GDP process 10% –
a Drift of the temperature process 0.035 ◦C –
η Natural trend of global average
temperature
−0.1% –
α Parameter modelling the impact
of mitigation efforts on the
temperature drift
1 –
β Volatility of the temperature
process
– (0–2 ◦C)
r Discount rate 1.5% (0.0–5.0%)
δ Depreciation rate of the
mitigation effort
0 –
ρ Impact of the temperature gap on
the disposable GDP
0.29% –
θ Parameter modelling the
magnitude of the delay
$1 Trillion –
t Timesteps of the processes 1 (year) –
D Parisian Window 50 (years) (0; 50)
V0 GDP in 2011 $69.993 (2011 Trillions) –
DG D P0 Disposable GDP in 2011 $69.832 (2011 Trillions) –
T Horizon 500years –
the medium sensitivity as found by Bahn et al. (2012). The volatility of the temperature
process was chosen to take different possible values, from β = 0 ◦C to β = 2 ◦C, in order
to better reflect the uncertainty that still surrounds climate and temperature models used for
forecasting and to better show the influence of such parameter on our results. The outcome of
themaximization problem is sensitive to the volatility. Given the variability that surrounds the
global average temperature and its anomalies, it did not seem reasonable to limit our analysis
to only one fixed standard deviation parameter. Because uncertainty is a core element in
climate change, it is necessary to include it in the in the decision maker’s optimal choice.
Considering that past temperatures and their variability are strongly dependent on frequency,
place, and tool of observation (IPCC 2014; Hansen et al. 2010), a volatility parameter ranging
from β = 0 ◦C to β = 2 ◦C seems reasonable. While standard deviations of β = 0 ◦C and
β = 2 ◦C are unlikely to be observed, it is very useful to test the model’s behaviour at the
extremes.
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The starting GDP value, V0, was chosen to be $69.993 trillion US dollars, and the drift
μ of the GDP process was set to 3%. Both these values were chosen based on the latest
reports on macroeconomic data (Central Intelligence Agency 2012; The World Bank 2012),
which in particular show an average annual drift in 2011 of 2.2% for developed countries
and 4.1% for developing countries. It is likely that more resources are spent on mitigation
and adaptation in developed than in developing countries, but this distinction is not taken into
account in our analysis. The volatility σ of the GDP process was chosen to be 10% (World
Bank Historical GDP Data).
The parameter δmodelswhether themitigation effort is a constant proportion of disposable
GDP (δ = 0), or if it decreases (δ > 0 ), or increases (δ < 0) over time. It was chosen to be
zero to simplify the optimization process. The parameter D represents the Parisian delay, i.e.,
the time window during which the temperature process has to stay above the threshold L1 for
the catastrophe to happen.20 The choice of D = 50 years as the time window is somewhat
arbitrary. It is a very short time in climatic terms, in line with the notion of a tipping point as
discussed by Lenton et al. (2008).21
4.1 Optimal temperature threshold and investment rate
Given the above parameters, the optimal mitigation investment threshold L∗ is determined
by allowing candidate values to vary between 14 and 22◦C in successive calculations of
the objective function in 14. Numerical simulations that utilize a grid search methodology
compute the expected discounted sum of future global disposable GDPs associated with
waiting for temperature to reach a level L∗ before investing a fraction k∗ in mitigation
technologies. The optimal fraction k∗ of disposable GDP that Governments can invest in
mitigation is chosen by allowing k to vary between 0 and 10%. In fact, higher investment
percentages are simply not realistic and the 10% limit never constrains the optimal value.22
The optimal levels L∗ and k∗ for various values of β are shown in Table 2. This means that
a solution (k∗, L∗) exists for each set of input parameters used. As discussed at the end of
Sect. 3.2, a solution might not exist for other parameter combinations, meaning in that case
that the optimum decision is never to implement the mitigation policy. As to unicity the issue
of multiple solution did not arise in any of the simulations.23
The optimal mitigation investment threshold varies between a minimum of 14 ◦C and a
maximum of 15.75 ◦C depending on the assumed volatility of the temperature process. This
means that the threshold date is already behind us (for low assumed temperature volatilities)
or is not far in the future (for higher volatilities). How far in the future? We examine this
question below (Table 2).
This result has implications that aremanifest in termsother than the timingof themitigation
investment decision. If we look at the optimal fraction of disposable GDP that needs to be
invested, year after year, once the decision to mitigate is taken, we find that k∗ lies between 1
20 The concept of Parisian delay has been borrowed from Parisian options, i.e., financial options whose
exercise is triggered by the length of the excursion of a price process above a threshold (Chesney et al. 1997
as well as Chesney and Gauthier 2006).
21 While tipping elements may be very heterogeneous and not yet entirely known, for the sake of simplicity
they are usually considered to trigger the same effects at the same time. Again as in Lenton et al. (2008), only
tipping elements caused by human activities are taken into consideration.
22 Indeed, although we do not model this phenomenon, Bahn et al. (2012) found that highly effective
adaptation measures can hinder investments in mitigation in the medium to long term.
23 In the maximization process, k∗ and L∗ are jointly and endogenously determined by relying on a grid
search method. In case of multiple local maxima for L , we take the supremum, so that our solution is always
unique.
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Table 2 Simulation results
r = 1.5%, D = 50 years β (
◦C) L∗ (◦C) k∗ (%)
0 14.0 1
0.1 14.0 1
0.3 14.75 2.5
0.5 15.0 3
0.75 15.75 4
1 14.9 5
1.5 14.3 6.8
2 14.0 7
and 7% depending on the volatility of the temperature process. Furthermore, for small values
of the volatility, there is a positive correlation between the optimal temperature threshold
and the optimal investment fraction: the higher the temperature threshold, the longer the
mitigation decision is postponed (optimally), and the higher the optimal investment effort.
This makes intuitive sense since the impact on the temperature drift will need to be stronger if
temperature is allowed to come closer to the catastrophe threshold L1 before any intervention.
This positive correlation between the optimal investment threshold L∗ and the optimal amount
to be invested inmitigation k∗ is observed at all reasonable levels of the temperature volatility.
It breaks down at high volatilities for reasons discussed below.
As implied by the results stated so far, the volatility of the temperature process is a crucial
parameter. This is why the optimal levels of L∗ and k∗ are presented for different possible
values of β in Table 2.
When expressing the optimal investment threshold L∗ as a function of the volatility β of
the temperature process, it is interesting to note how strong the relationship is between the
two. In fact, the level L∗ is driven by the uncertainty surrounding future temperature levels
in the following way: when uncertainty is fairly low, i.e., β ≤ 0.5 ◦C, it is easier to foresee an
increase in temperature levels in the future, given that the drift a of the process is positive, i.e.,
a = 0.035 per unit of time. In this case, it is optimal to invest as soon as possible. Conversely,
when the volatility of the temperature process is fairly high, i.e., β ≥ 0.50 ◦C, there is greater
uncertainty about future temperature levels. In fact, in this situation, the probability of lower
temperatures is higher than before. For β ≤ 0.75 ◦C, results are in line with traditional real
options theory: the investment boundary L∗ should be an increasing function of the volatility.
However, when volatility is very high, this no longer holds true. In this case, the presence
of a possible catastrophe provides incentives to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions sooner.
Indeed, L∗ grows only when β goes from 0 to 0.75 ◦C .
This non-monotonic relationship between optimal mitigation temperature and uncertainty
is also different from what has been reported in some of the literature on tipping points
(Keller et al. 2004; Brozovic´ and Schlenker 2011). The relationship is reversed in our model.
In fact, in the presence of a stochastic temperature process, given the ultimate impact of a
catastrophe, i.e., a permanent collapse of the global GDP and a delay between the breach of
the tipping point L1 and the occurrence of the catastrophe, the decision maker faces a trade-
off: strong uncertainty makes him cautious when risk increases. In this case, his objective is
to invest sooner, since the gain from waiting is not worth the additional expected cost linked
to the catastrophe. On the contrary, an increase in the uncertainty level makes the gain from
waiting the dominating strategy at lower risk levels.
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Fig. 2 Optimal investment threshold L∗ (Fig. 2a) and optimal mitigation investment fraction k∗ (Fig. 2b),
plotted against volatility β, for D = 50
In the standard real options theory, the optimal boundary is a monotonic function of the
risk. However, in some specific cases, in particular for double barrier American currency
calls, this non-monotonic feature might also be observed. With this specific option, if the
value of the currency reaches one of the barriers, then the option is lost. The loss of the
option plays the role of the catastrophe in the framework of this model. With such a barrier
option, an increase in volatility generates a higher exercise boundary when volatility levels
are small. However, with higher levels of the volatility, opposite effect appears: the exercise
boundary decreases when volatility increases. There is a trade-off between the potential
benefit that a volatility increase might generate, i.e., higher profit, and potential risks, i.e.,
higher probability of losing the option. For small levels of volatility, the first effect dominates;
for higher levels, the second one is stronger.
Concerning the effects on the optimal mitigation investment fraction k∗, this leads to
increases in β because the more volatile the temperature process is, the stronger the financial
effort needs to be in order to bring the temperature process back to acceptable levels. For
β > 0.75 ◦C, the optimal investment fraction k∗ keeps increasing but at a slower pace. This
behaviour is caused by the lower optimal investment threshold, which allows for smaller
increases in k∗. Figure 2a, b illustrate the relationships just mentioned.
The right part of Fig. 2a can be justified by looking at the behaviour of the expected catastrophe
date as a function of risk, pictured in Fig. 6b. When volatility grows, the expected date
decreases, making a high -and prompt- monetary investment necessary.
An important relationship to look at is the one occurring at TL , between the optimal amount
to be invested in mitigation k∗ and the volatility β. In our model, β is one of the parameters
determining the impacts of climate change on the expected discounted sum of future GDP.
Optimal mitigation efforts are an increasing function of the temperature volatility. Even with
the smallest volatilities, mitigation efforts are at least equal to 1% of the GDP as pictured in
Fig. 3a. This percentage is much higher than currently observed levels. It is also much higher
than the exogenous adaptation effort estimated to be 0.29% in this model. This justifies
prompt action in mitigation, in line with the latest international reports on climate change
(IPCC 2014).
Figure 3b shows the percentage gains obtained from undertaking mitigation efforts for
β = 0.75 ◦C in terms of disposable GDP and for different levels of the interest rate r . The
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Fig. 3 a Mitigation Efforts, as fraction of GDP, plotted against volatility β. b Cumulative DGDP gains (%)
of mitigation versus adaptation only, as function of r and for β = 0.75 ◦C
graph is obtained by comparing the expected sums of discounted disposable GDP with and
without mitigation, i.e., when mitigation efforts correspond to the optimal k∗ or to zero.
These gains are a decreasing function of the discount rate r . Indeed, when this rate is high,
costs generated by a future catastrophe, when discounted, might appear almost negligible.
When the discount rate is small, then a strongmitigation effort is required in order to decrease
environmental risks. In this case, interests of future generations are taken into account.
The relationship between mitigation and adaptation, and their impacts on the temperature
and on the disposableGDPprocess, is illustrated in Fig. 4. The upper part of the plot shows the
temperature process and its two different dynamics, without mitigation (green line; k = 0%)
and with optimal mitigation (black line; k∗ = 4%), for β = 0.75 ◦C. The lower part of
the plot shows the same relationship but expressed in terms of its impacts on the disposable
GDP, for r = 0. In this case, it is clear that investing in mitigation at time TL has caused
the drift of the temperature process to shift down at time TL + T (k, L), from a(0) = a
to a(0.04) < a. As a consequence, a catastrophe before T = 500 years has been avoided.
This allows for a higher discounted sum of future GDPs, given by the blue area below the
curve. Indeed, despite a lower disposable GDP as of TL , due to the fact that a fraction k
∗ > 0
has to be invested in mitigation each year, there are significant positive GDP flows instead
of zero (once the catastrophe has occurred) at later stages. These significant gains accrue to
future generations only. In the particular case pictured, this makes the strategy of investing in
mitigation the optimal k∗, i.e., k∗ = 4% for β = 0.75 ◦C, preferred to the strategy of doing
nothing, i.e. no investment in mitigation.
As argued in Sect. 1, the possibility of a climate catastrophe occurring and the impact
of mitigation decisions on its probability are arguably the most important questions facing
decision makers. For the stochastic processes used in this paper, the catastrophe is certain to
happen given a distant enough time horizon. However, it is possible to compute its expected
date if nothing is done and its expected date under the optimal policy as well as the sensitivity
of these expected dates to parameters. Although the expected date of a catastrophe occurring
is reduced by the optimal policy, we find that the possibility of its occurrence within the
next 500years is far from remote for small levels of risk. Figure 7a illustrates this idea.
The probability of the catastrophe occurring within the next 500years is between 5% and
100% depending on β. Given the proximity of that occurrence, we investigate its various
determinants further below.
To sum up the main results, depending on the volatility of the temperature process, the
optimal mitigation investment threshold varies between a minimum of 14 ◦C and amaximum
of 15.75 ◦C, and the optimum proportion of GDP invested in mitigation lies between 1 and
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7%. This proportion is much higher than currently observed levels. It is also much higher
than the exogenous adaptation effort estimated to be 0.29% in this model. The gains from
adopting an optimal mitigation policy are significant; they accrue to future generations only
while current generations incur costs.
There is positive correlation at realistic values of temperature volatility between the opti-
mal investment threshold and the optimal amount to be invested inmitigation; this correlation
breaks down at unrealistically high volatilities. In contrast, the relationship between the
optimal mitigation investment and temperature volatility is positive: the more volatile the
temperature process is, the stronger the financial effort needs to be in order to bring the
temperature process back to acceptable levels.
Finally, perhaps more concretely, the probability of the catastrophe occurring within the
next 500years lies between 5% and 100% depending on β. Indeed the volatility of the
temperature process is probably the most important exogenous factor affecting the results. In
the next section we conduct sensitivity analyses to changes in volatility and other key model
parameters.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Monte Carlo simulations were run using different values for the exogenous variables β, D,
and r to check their impact on the optimal choice that must be determined by the global
decision maker in the presence of global warming. Parameters that need to be considered
are the optimal temperature threshold L∗ that triggers the optimal investment in mitigation
as well as k∗, i.e., the fraction of disposable GDP to be invested in mitigation to achieve the
maximum expected discounted sum of future GDPs.
Figure 5 illustrates the maximum values of L∗ and k∗, plotted against different values of
the Parisian window D, for β = 0.75 ◦C. It is interesting to notice that, while the optimal
threshold L∗ remains constant when the excursion length D increases, the optimal fraction of
GDP to be invested in mitigation k∗ shows a decreasing behaviour. In other words, arguments
based on the assumption that long time windows allow for a greater time delay in the social
planner’s decision-making process do not seem to be justified: a longer window does not
imply a greater delay before investing in mitigation, but only a lower fraction k∗ of GDP to
be devoted to mitigation measures.
As we see in Fig. 6a, for small values of the risk, the expected date TL , i.e. the moment
when the threshold L is reached, increases when the volatility β increases. It should not to be
forgotten that when β ≤ 0.75 ◦C, the optimal temperature L∗, which triggers the investment
in mitigation k∗, increases when β increases. Therefore, it becomes more likely that the
barrier L∗ is also crossed at later stages. When β is higher than 0.75 ◦C, L∗ starts decreasing
again, thus the expected date TL decreases as well, since crossing the optimal investment
threshold might happen sooner.
Figure 6b shows the expected date of the environmental catastrophe when it is smaller
than T , i.e., when it happens within the chosen time horizon. The expected date decreases
when the volatility β increases. Without uncertainty (i.e., β = 0), this expected date in the
business-as-usual scenario is 175years. As risk increases, a catastrophe might happen sooner
and the expectation decreases.24
Figure 7a shows the probability that both events TL , the moment when the threshold L
that triggers the investment in mitigation k, and the catastrophe, happen within T = 500
years, plotted against the volatility β. The probability of both TL ≤ T and H+L1,D ≤ T
24 As we are not considering trajectories for which H+
L1,D
> T .
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decreases with an increase in the volatility parameter β. This relationship is expected: when
the volatility of the temperature process increases, the probability that such a process moves
away from the barrier L1 and a) never touches it or b) decreases and goes back below it
increases as well. In addition, as seen in Fig. 7a, the probability of the event H+L1,D ≤ T is
always smaller than the probability of the event TL ≤ T , because the optimal threshold L∗
is lower than the tipping point L1.
Figure 7b shows the probability of the event TL ≤ T , and the probability of the catastrophic
event H+L1,D ≤ T , plotted against different possible values of the Parisian window D. As
expected, the probability of the event TL ≤ T remains constant for a given volatility when
the Parisian window D increases, since this has no effect on where and when the temperature
process crosses the barrier L∗ and thus triggers the optimal investment in mitigation k∗ from
the global decision maker. Conversely, the probability of event H+L1,D ≤ T decreases, going
from almost 50% to about 6.9%.
Figure 7c illustrates the probability P(H+L1,D − TL1 = D), i.e., the probability that a
catastrophe will occur D units of time after the first time the temperature process passes the
tipping point L1. As expected, the longer the Parisian window D, the lower the probability
P(H+L1,D − TL1 = D). However, it can be clearly seen that such a probability remains fairly
high, i.e., above 80%, even for very long Parisian windows D. The presence of a large time
window does not imply that a catastrophe should be neglected.
4.3 A deterministic temperature process
Finally, as mentioned in Sect. 3, various values of α could be used; α defines the proportion
of disposable GDP that needs to be invested in order to eliminate anthropogenic elements in
the determination of the temperature drift. Setting α = 0.1 instead of α = 1, and assuming
a deterministic temperature process, we obtain the results shown in Fig. 8 by relying on
the analytical approach explained in “Appendix 3”. It shows that the optimal drift a(k) then
becomes negative provided the discount rate is small enough i.e. provided the interests of
future generations are given enough weight. In this case, it is optimal to avoid the catastro-
phe. With a higher discount rate, business as usual in terms of emissions leads to a global
catastrophe before the horizon T equals 500 years. Long-term catastrophes are almost negli-
gible today, when discounted at standard levels of interest rates. Unfortunately, only a small
discount rate will generate incentives to curb CO2 emissions and therefore decrease the drift
in temperature.
4.4 Summary of sensitivities
Sensitivity analyses allow us to shed light on important model results. First of all, as pictured
in Fig. 5, the length of the Parisian window D does not have a significant impact on the
optimal investment threshold L∗. However, it has an impact on the optimal fraction k∗ of
GDP to be invested in mitigation, which decreases when the time window increases. This
is indicative of the fact that larger investment is needed when the Parisian window is small,
because the temperature process needs to be brought down to acceptable levels more quickly.
Higher values for k∗ reduce the drift a(k) of the temperature process.
The expected date E[TL ], which indicates the expectation of the first passage time of
the temperature process above the optimal investment threshold L∗, initially increases as
volatility β increases. As soon as volatility crosses a critical level, the expected passage
time starts decreasing again (Fig. 6a). This behaviour closely resembles the behaviour of the
optimal temperature threshold L∗ when expressed as a function of the volatility β, as can
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Fig. 7 a Probability of TL ≤ T and probability of H+L1,D ≤ T , plotted against volatility β, for D = 50.
b Probability of TL ≤ T and probability of H+L1,D ≤ T , plotted against different lengths of the Parisian
Window D, for β = 0.75 ◦C. c Probability that a catastrophe occurs D units of time after TL1 , plotted against
different lengths of the Parisian Window D, for β = 0.75 ◦C
Fig. 8 Optimal mitigation investment fraction k∗ and temperature Drift a(k∗), plotted against interest rate r ,
for volatility β = 0 ◦C and α = 0.1
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be seen in Fig. 2a. The reason can be found in the fact that when the optimal investment
threshold L∗ decreases, the temperature process might cross it more easily. Conversely, the
expected dates E[TL1 ] and E[H+L1,D], which indicate respectively the expected first passage
time of the temperature process above the tipping point L1 and the expected date of the
catastrophe, are both monotonically decreasing functions of volatility β. In fact, as volatility
β increases, both the event TL1 and H
+
L1,D
could happen sooner (see Fig. 6b).
The probabilities of TL1 and H
+
L1,D
taking place before T = 500 years decrease as
volatility increases. In fact, as volatility increases, temperatures are likely to move away
from the tipping point L1, either never reaching it, or going back below it once crossed, thus
making the occurrence of events TL1 and H
+
L1,D
less probable before the horizon T .
5 Conclusion
Most IAM assume gradual environmental degradation and ignore the possibility of abrupt
events. This paper has emphasized the possibility of a climate catastrophe and the nature
of the policy decisions implied. The literature proposes many ways to model catastrophes,
including some fromwhich society recovers.Wehave chosen to envisage a ’final’ catastrophe,
the aftermath or which is impossible to predict or assess. Such a catastrophe may happen if
earth temperature reaches and exceeds some threshold.Whilemany researchers have assumed
the catastrophe threshold to be uncertain, which implies that a catastrophe will not occur if
temperature stays below any previously reached level that did not trigger a catastrophe, we
assume that the threshold is known but that the catastrophe happens only if the threshold
is exceeded for a long enough period (of 50year in our application). Our model reflects the
implied policy options: it may not be optimal but it is possible to delay mitigation decisions
until global temperature is dangerously high; the catastrophe might be avoided even if the
threshold that triggers it has been reached.
Besides climatemodelling, this paper attempts to reflect the institutional and technological
context under which policy decisions are arrived at. As illustrated by the results of the COP
21 in Paris in December 2015, policies often take the form of a “one shot” decision that is
irreversible and requires dedicating resources. The timing of the policy and the magnitude
of the engagement must be chosen optimally. This consideration has motivated the adoption
of a real option formulation as that methodology is particularly well adapted to such optimal
stopping problems.
Real optionsmodels havemostly emphasized the timing of decisions.Ourmodel innovates
in that the choice of the optimum date for implementing the mitigation decision is combined
with the choice of the optimal mitigation effort. For a discount rate of 1.5% and with a
temperature volatility of 0.3 ◦C, Monte Carlo simulations show that governments should
invest 2.5% of disposable GDPs in mitigation when the temperature process hits 14.75 ◦C
in order for the world to achieve the maximum possible expected discounted sum of future
disposableGDP.Unfortunately, global temperature level has already reached this threshold. If
the volatility of the temperature process is 0.75 ◦C, the optimal investment boundary increases
to 15.75 ◦C, implying that there may still be some time left to invest in mitigation, although
a larger investment must then be devoted to it.
In any case investing in mitigation is urgent, and adaptation cannot be considered a sub-
stitute. Indeed, the optimum proportion of GDP that should be invested in mitigation lies
between 1 and 7%. This proportion is much higher than currently observed levels. It is also
much higher than the exogenous adaptation effort estimated to be 0.29% in this model.
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The relationship between the optimal temperature threshold and temperature volatility
is not monotonic; the optimal threshold diminishes when the assumed volatility increases
beyond about .75 ◦C. This is because two opposing effects determine the optimal temperature
threshold. The first effect is that one may regret an early mitigation decision if the temper-
ature is not to increase as quickly as forecast while the expenditure in GDP is irreversibly
committed. Such a source of regret is less likely when volatility is low because forecasts are
then more reliable, so that the mitigation decision may be taken early if volatility is low and
should be postponed if volatility is high. The second effect is that, given any current tempera-
ture, the probability for temperature to reach the level that may trigger the catastrophe within
a given period is higher, the higher the volatility. Precaution then calls for earlier mitigation,
the higher the volatility. In our simulations, the first effect dominates at low volatilities; the
second effect dominates at high volatilities. In other words, the decision maker is confronted
with a trade-off between the irreversibility associated with the investment in mitigation and
the irreversibility associated with the climate catastrophe in the absence of investments in
mitigation. In this setting, the optimization process implies for the policy maker that the date
to start mitigation has already been exceeded both if the actual volatility is lower than about
0.3 ◦C and if it is higher than 1 ◦C but not for intermediate volatility levels.
The impact of volatility on the optimal investment rate turns out to be monotonic unlike
the impact on the temperature threshold. This is because a third element enters the invest-
ment decision. When volatility is high, the effort necessary to keep temperature away from
dangerous levels is higher. Accordingly, even if the expected optimal date of implementa-
tion decreases when volatility rises at high volatility, which gives mitigation more time to
be effective, the risk of catastrophe associated with high temperature fluctuations calls for a
commitment of higher magnitude than when volatility is low.
All in all, a model is only a model and our’s is not immune to Pindyck’s (Pindyck 2015)
criticism that models can be packed with the assumptions necessary to generate the conclu-
sions desired by their authors. Nevertheless, if one believes that a climate catastrophe is a
possibility to take into consideration and that a catastrophe is not just another mishap, the
assumptions adopted in this paper are moderate, transparent, and justified by the observation
of reality. It is also comforting that the message to be drawn from our paper is not very differ-
ent from what other researches involving climate catastrophes conclude. Mitigation cannot
be dispensed with. Mitigation is urgent. Adaptation is not a substitute for mitigation. The
effort that needs to be extended will be higher, the longer mitigation is postponed.
Acknowledgments The authors’ deepest gratitude goes to Dr. Delia Coculescu, Department of Banking and
Finance, University of Zürich, for the helpful suggestions. The authors would also like to thank two anonymous
referees for their insightful comments and editorial advices.
Appendix 1: Some mathematical tools
For x = C0, we have Ct = x + at + βWt , or Ct = x + βZ t , with Z t a drifted Q−Brownian
motion, i.e., (Z t = γ t + Wt , t ≥ 0), with γ =
(
a
β
)
.
Let us now define the following functions in terms of T (Chesney et al. 1997):
TL1(C) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Ct ≥ L1} (17)
g
L1
t (C) = sup{s ∈ [0, t] : Ct ≥ L1} (18)
H+L1,D(C) = inf{t ≥ 0 :
(
t − gL1t (C)
)
≥ D and Ct ≥ L1} (19)
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or in terms of Z
TL1(Z) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Z t ≥ l1} (20)
g
l1
t (Z) = sup{s ∈ [0, t] : Z t ≥ l1} (21)
H+l1,D(Z) = inf{t ≥ 0 :
(
t − gl1t (Z)
)
≥ D and Z t ≥ l1} (22)
with
l1 =
L1 − C0
β
.
They are, respectively, the first instant the temperature process hits the given level L1, the
last instant before t when this process was at a given level L1, and the Parisian time, i.e., the
first instant when the process spends consecutively D units of time over the level L1. Notice
that ght (C) is not a stopping time. When this random time happens, there is no way to know
immediately that it has just happened. We will note H+L1,D for H
+
L1,D
(C).
The mathematical tools useful in this context are the following:
1. The random variables H+l1,D and Z H+l1,D
are independent
2. The law of Z H+l1,D
is known
P(Z H+l1,D
∈ dy) = dy
D
Iy>L(y − l1) exp
(
−
(
(y − l1)2
2D
))
(23)
with y = (Z H+l1,D − ZTL1 )
3. The Laplace transform of H+L1,D is given by Chesney et al. (1997)
E
(
exp
(
−λ
2
2
H+L1,D
))
= exp(l1λ)
(λ
√
D)
(24)
where the function  is known
(y) =
∫ +∞
0
z exp
(
zy − z
2
2
)
dz = 1+
√
2π ye
y2
2 N (y) (25)
and
N (y) = 1√
2π
∫ y
−∞
e−
x2
2 dx . (26)
Appendix 2: The boundedness argument
By relying on Section 2.1 of the textbook entitled “Optimal Stopping and Free Boundary
Problems” by Peskir and Shiryaev (2006), if the following condition is satisfied, the problem
is mathematically well-defined:
X ≡ EP sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣
∫ t+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
t∧T
DG D Pu (1− k) e−rudu
+
∫ H+L1,D∧T
t+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
D̂G D Pu (1− k) e−rudu
−
∫ T
t∧T
DG D Pue
−rudu
∣∣∣∣ < +∞ (27)
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The measure P used in the expectation is related to is the so-called historical probability, that
is to say the probability which reflects historical data.
The expectation can be rewritten as follows:
X = EP sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣− k
∫ t+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
t∧T
DG D Pue
−rudu
−
∫ T
t+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
DG D Pue
−rudu
+ (1− k)
∫ H+L1,D∧T
t+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
D̂G D Pue
−rudu
∣∣∣∣ (28)
The functions in the three integrals are positive and k is smaller than 1. Therefore:
X ≤ EP
[
max
(
(k + 1)
∫ T
0
DG D Pue
−rudu, (1− k)
∫ T
0
D̂G D Pue
−rudu
)]
(29)
Given the definition of DGDP in Eq. (3) and of D̂G D P in Eq. (13):
X ≤ EP
[
max
(
(k + 1)
∫ T
0
Vue
−rudu, (1− k)
∫ T
0
Vue
−rudu
)]
(30)
i.e.,
X ≤ (k + 1)EP
∫ T
0
Vue
−rudu (31)
Given the definition of the process V in Eq. (2), and by relying on Ito’s lemma:
X ≤ (k + 1)EP
(∫ T
0
e−(r−μ)u · e− σ
2
2 u+σ Bu du
)
(32)
The process {e− σ
2
2 u+σ Bu , u ≥ 0} is a P−martingale; therefore by relying on Fubini’s theo-
rem:
X ≤ (k + 1)
∫ T
0
e−(r−μ)udu ≤ (k + 1)
r − μ
(
1− e−(r−μ)T
)
< +∞  (33)
Appendix 3: The particular case of a deterministic temperature process
Recall our objective function:
sup
k,L
f (k, L)⇔ sup
k,L
[
1L<L1 · g1(k, L)+ 1L≥L1 · g2(k, L)
]
(34)
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with
g1(k, L) = EP
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
∫ TL∧T
0
DG D Pue
−rudu︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1a
+
∫ TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
TL∧T
DG D Pu
(
1− ke−δu) e−rudu︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1b
+
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
D̂G D Pu
(
1− ke−δu) e−rudu
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1c
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (35)
and
g2(k, L) = EP
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
∫ TL∧H+L1,D∧T
0
DG D Pue
−rudu︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2a
+
∫ TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
TL∧H+L1,D∧T
DG D Pu
(
1− ke−δu) e−rudu
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2b
+
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
D̂G D Pu
(
1− ke−δu) e−rudu
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2c
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (36)
In the absence of volatility, i.e., when β = 0, and given our set of parameters, as in Table 1,
the integrals in Eqs. (35) and (36) can be solved quasi-analytically.
In order to do so, we will rely on a few facts. First, we know that min(TL , T ) = TL and that
min(TL + T (k, L), T ) = TL + T (k, L). Moreover, since all the integrals are bounded
by construction, it is possible to use Fubini’s theorem to bring expected values inside the
integrals.
Furthermore, wewillmake use of the fact that, given the dynamics of the temperature process,
i.e., dCt = adt + σdWt , we have Ct = C0+ at +βWt . With respect to the dynamics of the
GDP process, i.e., dVt = μVt dt + σVt d Bt , we obtain Vt = V0e
(
μ− σ22
)
t+σ Bt
.
Other useful equalities that will be extensively used are
δ = 0 (37)
α = 0.1 (38)
TL =
L − C0
a
≤ 22− 14.8
0.035
= 205.7 < T = 500 for L ∈ [14, 22] (39)
a(k) = a − (a − ǫ) k
α
(40)
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5.1 L < L1
• Integral I1a
I1a = EP
∫ TL∧T
0
DG D Pue
−rudu
= EP
∫ TL
0
V0e
(
μ− σ22
)
u+σ Bu
e−ρ(C0+au−CP )e−rudu
=
∫ TL
0
V0e
(μ−ρa−r)u EP[e−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu ]e−ρ(C0−CP )du
We know that {e− σ
2
2 t+σ Bt , t ≥ 0} is a martingale, therefore E[e− σ
2
2 t+σ Bt ] = 1. We can
then write
I1a = V0e−ρ(C0−CP )
∫ TL
0
e(μ−ρa−r)udu
= V0e−ρ(C0−CP )
e(μ−ρa−r)TL − 1
μ− ρa − r (41)
where TL is given by (39).
• Integral I1b
In Integral 1b,wehave to distinguish twodifferent cases, based onwhether TL+T (k, L)
is smaller or greater than H+L1,D .
I1b = EP
∫ TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
TL∧T
DG D Pu (1− k) e−rudu
= EP
∫ T−TL
0
(∫ TL+t∧H+L1,D
TL
V0e
(
μ− σ22
)
u+σ Bu
e−ρ(C0+au−CP ) (1− k) e−rudu
)
×P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
= V0(1− k)e−ρ(C0−C p)EP
∫ T−TL
0
(∫ TL+t∧H+L1,D
TL
e(μ−ρa−r)ue−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu du
)
×P (T (k, L) ∈ dt) (42)
This integral can be rewritten as
I1b = V0(1− k)e−ρ(C0−C p)
{
EP
∫ L1−L
a
+D
0
(∫ TL+t
TL
e(μ−ρa−r)ue−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu du
)
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
+EP
∫ T−TL
L1−L
a
+D
(∫ L1−C0
a
+D
TL
e(μ−ρa−r)ue−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu du
)
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
}
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We can now apply Fubini’s theorem to find
I1b = V0(1− k)e−ρ(C0−C p)
{∫ L1−L
a
+D
0
(∫ TL+t
TL
e(μ−ρa−r)u EP
[
e−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu
]
du
)
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
+
∫ T−TL
L1−L
a
+D
(∫ L1−C0
a
+D
TL
e(μ−ρa−r)u EP
[
e−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu
]
du
)
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
}
= V0(1− k)e−ρ(C0−C p)
{∫ L1−L
a
+D
0
(∫ TL+t
TL
e(μ−ρa−r)udu
)
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
+
∫ T−TL
L1−L
a
+D
(∫ L1−C0
a
+D
TL
e(μ−ρa−r)udu
)
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
}
where we relied on the fact that
{
e−
σ2
2 t+σ Bt , t ≥ 0
}
is a martingale. We then have
I1b =
V0(1− k)e−ρ(C0−C p)
μ− ρa − r
{∫ L1−L
a
+D
0
(
e(μ−ρa−r)(TL+t) − e(μ−ρa−r)TL
)
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
+
∫ T−TL
L1−L
a
+D
(
e(μ−ρa−r)(
L1−C0
a
+D) − e(μ−ρa−r)TL
)
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
}
= V0(1− k)e
−ρ(C0−C p)
μ− ρa − r
{∫ L1−L
a
+D
0
e(μ−ρa−r)(TL+t)P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
− e(μ−ρa−r)TLP
(
T (k, L) ≤ L1 − L
a
+ D
)
+
(
e(μ−ρa−r)(
L1−C0
a
+D)−e(μ−ρa−r)TL
)
P
(
L1−L
a
+D≤T (k, L) ≤ T − TL
)}
where
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt) = ∂P (T (k, L) ≤ t)
∂t
=
∂P
(
θ
VTL ke
−ρ(L−CP ) ≤ t
)
∂t
=
∂P
(
VTL ≥ θkte−ρ(L−CP )
)
∂t
For K (t) = θ
kte−ρ(L−CP ) , we have
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt) =
∂P
(
V0e
(
μ− σ22
)
TL+σ BTL ≥ K (t)
)
∂t
=
∂P
(
− BTL√
TL
≤ d2(t)
)
∂t
= ∂N (d2(t))
∂t
= 1√
2π
e
−d2(t)2
2 · 1
K (t)σ
√
TL
· θ
kt2e−ρ(L−CP )
(43)
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and where
d2(t) =
ln
(
V0
K (t)
)
+
(
μ− σ 22
)
TL
σ
√
TL
(44)
• Integral I1c
By proceeding along the same lines as Integral I1b, we have
I1c = EP
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+T (k,L)∧H+L1,D∧T
D̂G D Pu (1− k) e−rudu
= EP
∫ L1−L
a
+D
0
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+t
D̂G D Pu (1− k) e−rudu · P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
Indeed, if TL +T (k, L) is higher than L1−La + D, the integral is equal to zero.
I1c = EP
∫ L1−L
a
+D
0
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+t
V0e
(
μ− σ22
)
u+σ Bu
e−ρ(C0+a(k)u−CP ) (1− k) e−rudu ·
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
= V0 (1− k) e−ρ(C0−CP )EP
∫ L1−L
a
+D
0
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+t
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)ue−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu du ·
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
= V0 (1− k) e−ρ(C0−CP )
{
EP
∫ L1−L
a
0
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+t
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)ue−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu du ·
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
+ EP
∫ L1−L
a
+D
L1−L
a
∫ H+L1,D∧T
TL+t
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)ue−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu du · P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
}
(45)
Indeed, when T (k, L) is smaller than L1−L
a
, the temperature process will never reach
the tipping point L1. In this case, the catastrophe is avoided and the upper bound of the
second integral is T .
Applying Fubini’s theorem and since
{
e−
σ2
2 t+σ Bt , t ≥ 0
}
is a martingale, we have
I1c = V0 (1− k) e−ρ(C0−CP )
·
{[∫ L1−L
a
0
∫ TL+t+ L1−(L+at)a(k) +D
TL+t
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)udu · P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
+
∫ L1−L
a
+D
L1−L
a
∫ TL+ L1−La +D
TL+t
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)udu · P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
]
· 1a(k)>0
+
[ ∫ L1−L
a
0
∫ T
TL+t
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)udu · P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
]
· 1a(k)≤0
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+
[ ∫ L1−L
a
+D
L1−L
a
∫ TL+ L1−La +D
TL+t
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)udu · P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
]
· 1a(k)∈[X,0]
+
[ ∫ L1−L
a
+D
L1−L
a
∫ T
TL+t
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)udu · P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
]
· 1a(k)∈[−∞,X ]
}
(46)
Indeed, when T (k, L) is higher than L1−L
a
, the catastrophe can still be avoided, if the
time spent by the temperature process above the tipping point L1 is smaller than D units
of time, i.e. if T (k, L)− L1−L
a
+ L1−(L−at)
a(k)
≤ D, i.e. if the new drift a(k) is negative
and small enough, that is:
a(k) ≤ X (47)
where:
X = L1 − L − aT (k, L)
D −T (k, L)+ L1−L
a
≤ 0 for X ∈
[
L1 − L
a
,
L1 − L
a
+ D
]
(48)
When a(k) belongs to [X, 0], the temperature drift is not small enough to avoid a catastro-
phe. The latter will occur at date TL + L1−La + D. If a(k) is smaller than X , then the
catastrophe will never occur. In this case, the GDP is maximized until time horizon T .
Then
I1c =
V0 (1− k) e−ρ(C0−CP )
μ− ρa(k)− r
·
{[ ∫ L1−L
a
0
e
(μ−ρa(k)−r)
(
TL+t+ L1−(L+at)a(k) +D
)
P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
−
∫ L1−L
a
0
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)(TL+t)P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
+e(μ−ρa(k)−r)
(
TL+ L1−La +D
)
P
(
L1 − L
a
≤ T (k, L) ≤ L1 − L
a
+ D
)
−
∫ L1−L
a
+D
L1−L
a
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)(TL+t)P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
]
· 1a(k)>0
+
[
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)TP
(
T (k, L) ≤ L1 − L
a
)
−
∫ L1−L
a
0
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)(TL+t)P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
]
· 1a(k)≤0
+
[
e
(μ−ρa(k)−r)
(
TL+ L1−La +D
)
P
(
L1 − L
a
≤ T (k, L) ≤ L1 − L
a
+ D
)
−
∫ L1−L
a
+D
L1−L
a
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)(TL+t)P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
]
· 1a(k)∈[X,0]
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+
[
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)TP
(
L1 − L
a
≤ T (k, L) ≤ L1 − L
a
+ D
)
−
∫ L1−L
a
+D
L1−L
a
e(μ−ρa(k)−r)(TL+t)P (T (k, L) ∈ dt)
]
· 1a(k)∈[−∞,X ]
}
(49)
5.2 L ≥ L1
In order to solve Integrals I2a, I2b and I2c, all the tools used to solve analytically the previous
integrals have been applied.
• Integral I2a
I2a = EP
∫ TL∧H+L1,D∧T
0
DG D Pue
−rudu
= V0e−ρ(C0−CP )
{
EP
∫ TL
0
e(μ−ρa−r)ue−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu du · 1TL<H+L1,D
+ EP
∫ H+L1,D
0
e(μ−ρa−r)ue−
σ2
2 u+σ Bu du · 1TL≥H+L1,D
}
As opposed to before, here when TL ≥ H+L1,D , i.e., when L ≥ L1 + aD, then H
+
L1,D
=
L1−C0
a
+ D, which is deterministic.
I2a = V0e−ρ(C0−CP )
{∫ TL
0
e(μ−ρa−r)udu · 1L<L1+aD
+
∫ H+L1,D
0
e(μ−ρa−r)udu · 1L≥L1+aD
}
= V0e
−ρ(C0−CP )
μ− ρa − r
·
[(
e(μ−ρa−r)TL − 1
)
· 1L<L1+aD +
(
e(μ−ρa−r)(
L1−C0
a
+D) − 1
)
· 1L≥L1+aD
]
• Integral I2b
If L is high enough, the catastrophe occurs before the temperature level L is reached. In
this case, the integral I2b is equal to zero, then
I2b = I1b · 1L<L1+aD (50)
• Integral I2c
As in integral I2b, if L is high enough then the catastrophe occurs before the temperature
level L is reached. In this case, the integral I2c is equal to zero, so
I2c = I1c · 1L<L1+aD (51)
In Figure 9, we shed light on the unicity of the solution when the temperature process is
deterministic:
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Appendix 4: Curbing emissions and its effects on future temperatures
As can be inferred from Fig. 10, it would take a long time after emissions are reduced to
acceptable levels before the global mean temperature would reach its pre-industrialization
level (Friedlingstein et al. 2011; IPCC 2013).
Fig. 10 Decay rate of
temperature as a function of
emission reductions
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Abstract India is a fast growing economy with a fast
growing population. Estimations indicate that in the
next few years, it will be the world’s most popu-
lous country, with China only second. These devel-
opments, together with high urbanization rates, are
putting increasing pressure on the energy sector and
driving the attention to energy efficiency. The issue is
not only financial but also social and environmental.
One of the schemes developed to promote energy effi-
ciency in the residential housing sector is the Super
Efficient Equipment Program (SEEP), which aims at
reducing energy consumption in Indian households,
by subsidizing the production of super efficient fans.
Emphasis is put into increasing economies of scale
and balancing possible losses in market power for
producers. However, the scheme does not take into
consideration consumers’ behavior in the market and
their purchasing propensity toward energy efficient
fans. In this article, we develop an econometric model
that takes consumers’ preferences and behavior into
B. Troja
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Plattenstrasse 32, 8032, Zurich, Switzerland
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e-mail: bruno.troja@bf.uzh.ch
consideration, by analyzing how these influence the
success of the SEEP scheme. To do so, the price elas-
ticity of energy efficient fans is calculated. We will
then apply it to the SEEP subsidy scheme in order to
assess how the quantity of super efficient fans sold
varies with changes in the price. Using projected data
on residential housing floor space in India, we will
estimate the percentage of super efficient fans sold and
calculate future energy savings. We are finally able to
infer whether the SEEP scheme is capable of meeting
its goals.
Keywords Energy efficiency · Energy efficient
buildings · Green housing · Subsidy · Climate
change · CO2
Introduction
Energy efficiency has drawn a lot of attention world-
wide, being considered as one among the best and
most effective mitigation solution to climate change.
The spectrum of possibilities for this scope is wide
and heterogeneous. Nevertheless, attention has usually
been focused on the transportation and on the build-
ing sector. As both account for more than 20 % of
global greenhouse gas emissions yearly (about 16 %
the first, about 8 % the latter, excluding emissions
from energy supply, which alone account for about
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41 %), it is of particular importance to find adequate
ways to direct mitigation (and later adaptation) efforts
to these two sectors by the means of energy efficiency
(IPCC 2014).
The building sector has, compared to others, high
mitigation potential, while, at the same time, ben-
efiting from a certain degree of cost-effectiveness.
However, improving energy use in the building sector
is not without difficulties. The problem is particu-
larly evident in developing countries and specifically
in Asia, where the urban population is growing at
rates not experienced in the past (World Health Orga-
nization 2012). According to the Asian Development
Bank (2012), the number of megacities (cities with
population of more than 10 million individuals) will
keep growing, the larger share to be found in the two
most populous countries in the world, China and India.
In light of this, the problem of sustainable buildings
becomes of urgent solution.
Current GDP growth and increasing number of
people moving from rural areas toward cities located
in the most developed regions, imply a higher
future demand for electricity. As an example, as
income increases, the demand for air coolers increases
(Phadke et al. 2014). In addition, global warming will
obviously be itself an additional driver for higher elec-
tricity demand. The issue of energy efficiency for
residential housing is particularly serious in India.
According to UN projections, India will be the most
populous country by 2060, hosting approximately 1.7
billion people (James 2011). For what concerns its
impact on the environment, India, in 2014, placed
itself third in the ranking of the biggest emitters,
although per capita greenhouse gas emissions are
among the lowest. Almost one third of the energy
available in India is consumed by the residential and
commercial building sectors. Kumar (2010) estimates
that by 2030, the Indian commercial building stock, in
square meters, will increase by 70 %. However, it is
expected that residential buildings will grow at high
rates as well. Bhattacharyya (2015) estimates that by
2030 the energy demand in the Indian residential sec-
tor will be four times higher than what it was in 2010.
In light of these results, it is clear the extent of the
energy burden India will have to bear, a big share of
which originating from the residential building sec-
tor. Moreover, the differences between consumption
in rural and urban India are still strong. Monthly per
capita consumption of electricity in rural India is about
8.9 kWh per month, at an average cost of 25 Rupees
($0.38) per Kilowatt. Conversely, in urban India, an
individual consumes on average 25.8 kWh of electric-
ity per month, at a cost of around 87 Rupees ($1.33)
per Kilowatt.1
In order to promote the diffusion of energy effi-
ciency in construction methods and in the type of
appliances produced and sold, the Government of
India has developed some standards and some financ-
ing schemes. Among the first, we find the Standard
and Labelling (S&L) Program and the Energy Con-
servation Building Code. The Standard and Labelling
Program, launched in the Spring of 2005, applies
energy scoring labels to many electrical appliances,
such as refrigerators, air conditioners, LPG stoves,
washing machines, color TVs, and ceiling fans. It
is meant to provide costumers with an easy-to-read
energy score in order to help them make an informed
choice about the energy consumption of their desired
appliance. It does not set any minimum requirement
to the producers of such appliances, as the label is
provided ex-post. Established in 2007, the Energy
Conservation Building Code aims at revolutionizing
the way buildings are constructed. It regulates light-
ing, cooling, the electrical systems, and also the way
the building envelope has to be designed (Liu et al.
2010). For what concerns financing mechanisms, one
of the most important ones, in terms of investments
and goals, is the Super Efficient Equipment Program
(SEEP). The SEEP scheme consists in a subsidy paid
out to producers of electrical appliances, so to make
the price of an energy efficient item similar to the price
of the non-energy efficient ones. The idea is to pro-
mote the purchase and diffusion among households
of energy-saving electrical appliances, so to obtain an
avoided electricity capacity of 19,000 MW in the pilot
phase of the program, i.e., the first 3 years (Climate
Investment Funds 2013). During this phase, the pro-
gram is oriented at subsidizing maximum Rp. 250, or
$3.81, to the producers of the so called super effi-
cient cooling fans, which have an energy consumption
of 35 W, much lower than the most efficient fan
currently sold in India, which on average consumes
around 65 Watts. In other words, and thanks to this
scheme, manufacturers can now have the opportunity
1Indian Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation,
http://mospi.nic.in/Mospi New/site/home.aspx
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to “develop, produce, and sell super efficient equip-
ment and appliances (SEE) at prices comparable to
an average appliance” (Chunekar and Singh 2013).
The total sum financed amounts to $50,000,000 (Rp.
761,500) in the pilot phase of the program, and the
main sponsors of the program is the Clean Technology
Fund (Climate Investment Funds 2013).
As the Super Efficient Equipment Program looks
very promising, the goal of our research will be to
assess whether such subsidy scheme for energy effi-
ciency is tackling the right entities, for the correct
amount, and it is capable of obtaining the results
sought after by the Government of India. Using data
on household consumption, on demand of building
and appliances, population projections and income,
we will first find consumer preferences for energy
efficient fans and then, using future electricity-use
projections, we will determine whether this financing
mechanism is capable of making a difference and how
policies can drive households in knowing, choosing
and taking advantage of the right incentives.
This article is structured in the following way. In
the “Literature review” section, the current state of
the literature on energy efficiency and energy demand
in India is discussed. In the “Econometric assessment
of the super efficient equipment program in India”
section, the model is be presented and explained in
details. In the “Future projections and future energy
savings” section, we estimate the future demand for
super efficient appliances. The “Results and discus-
sion” section presents and discusses the results of the
analysis. Finally, in the “Conclusion” section, some
conclusions are drawn.
Literature review
Energy efficiency has always been considered as an
effective cost saving solution to climate change (IPCC
2014). Since more than a decade, the scientific com-
munity and academia have started to study its develop-
ment and applications. Sinha (2015) shows that energy
efficiency can act as a driver of economic growth in
India. Despite this, the diffusion of efficient appli-
ances has been facing difficulties. Some structural
barriers, common to many developing countries, have
been identified in the literature, since their compre-
hension and analysis are important for a better design
and management of policies and business practices.
Reddy and Shrestha (1998) identify several barriers,
such as lack of awareness, high costs, non-availability
in the market of the desired efficient goods, uncertain
savings over the long run and uninterested consumers.
Hirst and Brown (1990) consider two main categories
of barriers to the development of energy efficiency.
The authors distinguish between structural and behav-
ioral barriers. Among the first, they identify those
elements out of the control of end-users, such as fuel
prices, supply characteristics, difficult access to cap-
ital, and suboptimal regulatory policies. Among the
behavioral characteristics, the authors identify mis-
placed incentives, individual attitude toward risk and
also personal beliefs about energy efficiency. What
makes the issue even more problematic are the inter-
dependencies, at time obvious at times subtle, between
the two groups and between the elements of the same
group. In the category of non-behavioral barriers, we
find an element common to many developing coun-
tries and to India particularly, that is price distortion
(Gunatilake et al. 2014). Due to the fact that elec-
tricity is heavily subsidized, trades at very low cost
and it is anyway too differentiated across regions, the
signal that arrives to customers and to end users in
general is not reflecting the correct price. In this set-
ting, consumers cannot value correctly the trade off
between electricity savings and the cost of implement-
ing energy efficient measures. Other two important
barriers that hinder the success of energy efficiency
projects are transaction costs and contract enforce-
ment. As shown by Shukla and Chaturvedi (2013), the
first is a very problematic issue, and greatly influences
the financial perspective and the diffusion of energy
efficiency. Transaction costs are a problem in this set-
ting not only for India but also for any other country
and regard in the specific the residential building sec-
tor, where projects are developed on a (fairly) small
scale.
Issues with contract enforcement are a fundamen-
tal element for any business environment. Among
other consequences (lack of property rights, diffi-
culty in forcing the contract to be executed, cer-
tainty of legal sentence in court), what this implies
for corporate finance is a tendency, from companies,
to vertically integrate. This mirrors their preference
toward the internal development of projects, channel-
ing resources internally rather than externally (Taylor
et al. 2008). This could somehow lead to subopti-
mal business strategies for the firm. What could be
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done by external consultant or project developers with
expertise in the field and (better) access to financ-
ing, will probably be done internally where specific
knowledge is lacking, as it is often the cases in devel-
oping countries. Doing so, the probability of wasting
financial resources for due diligence and for undertak-
ing wrong investments is higher. The issue of weak
contract enforcement is particularly true, as already
mentioned, in developing countries and specifically in
India, which, in the list of countries ranked by the rate
of contract enforcing, positioned itself 184th over 185
countries. This weakness is also reflected by the Ease
to do Business ranking, where India positioned 132nd
over the same 185 Countries. Obviously, for not so
widespread and not so mature business practices, as
investments in residential energy efficiency could be,
it is very hard to obtain financing and lead projects
to completion. This issue is particularly severe as it
influences the success of minimum standards and of
financing schemes. In fact, as Phadke et al. (2014)
have noted, the diffusion of energy efficiency in res-
idential housing has yet to pick up momentum and
these mechanisms have to be revised and improved
significantly.
The presence of these barriers is one of the rea-
sons why financing schemes such as subsidies are
preferred. However, even without barriers, this kind
of market interventions require a good understanding
and a good estimation of business practices and of the
purchasing attitude of the consumers (Liu et al. 2015).
Some important studies have identified consumer
behavior and purchasing propensity as important vari-
ables in the estimation of energy demand and its diffu-
sion. For example, analyzing urban household survey
data in India, Filippini and Pachauri (2004) find that
electricity is a necessary good with a fairly inelastic
demand, stable over three different climatic seasons,
i.e., summer, winter, and monsoon season. There is
no doubt that this has strong implications for policies
aimed at reducing energy poverty and/or at increasing
energy efficiency in India. Micro-level household sur-
vey data is used by Pachauri (2004) as well, who finds
that energy demand in India is extremely dependent
on the income level of the household. Moreover, the
author finds that the age of the head of the household
is a driver for energy consumption, while an higher
literacy level of the household contributes to a more
efficient energy usage. Both Filippini and Pachauri
(2004) and Pachauri (2004) prove that understanding
consumers’ characteristics and behavior in estimating
the demand for energy is a key aspect to keep in mind.
Our analysis draws from these two articles and uses
consumer preferences, in the form of price elastici-
ties, in order to understand whether the Super Efficient
Equipment Program (SEEP) is capable of transform-
ing in the short term the demand for energy efficient
appliances and consequently their market.
Econometric assessment of the super efficient
equipment program in India
In India, households in urban and rural areas are grow-
ing in absolute numbers, as shown in Table 1. Changes
in the average numbers of occupants per household
are an important indicator of future consumption. If in
the past only one item was needed for a certain num-
ber of people, now this number is decreasing, so that
more items will be bought. As an example, if in urban
India, in 2001, a refrigerator or a fan could be enough
for slightly more than five people, now one refrigera-
tor, on average, will satisfy the needs of less than four.
Details can be seen in Table 2. At this stage, the ques-
tion becomes: are existing financing schemes enough
Table 1 Indian population and households
Population Occupied residential buildings
Year Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
2001 286,119,689 742,490,639 1,028,610,328 55,436,290 137,235,518 192,671,808
(27.82 %) (72.18 %) (100 %) (28.77 %) (71.23 %) (100.00 %)
2011 377,105,760 833,087,662 1,210,193,422 99,046,223 207,116,576 306,162,799
(31.16 %) (68.84 %) (100 %) (32.35 %) (67.65 %) (100.00 %)
Source: India Census Office
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Table 2 Average occupants per household
Average number of occupants per household
Year Urban Rural Urban + Rural
2001 5.10 5.40 5.33
2011 3.80 4.02 3.95
to guide the Indian population toward a more sus-
tainable consumption, mainly in terms of energy effi-
ciency? In this section, the article provides empirical
estimation of the impacts of introducing a price sub-
sidy for the production of super efficient fans under
the National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency
- Super Efficient Equipment Program (SEEP).
The analysis is conducted via an econometric
approach. The price elasticity of energy efficient fans
will be calculated and compared to the one of non-
energy efficient ones. Additionally, the price elasticity
of demand for urban and rural households will be cal-
culated as well. This last estimation will make the
projection of future energy consumption and savings
possible. Data on prices, quantities, and other macroe-
conomic variables needed for the analysis have been
obtained by Thomson Datastream for what concerns
the electric fans’ quantity and price data, the National
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) Rounds for what
concerns disposable income and mean per capita
expenditure data, and the Government of India for
what concerns households’ statistics.
One of the main issues when analyzing time series
of cooling and/or heating appliances is the seasonality
factor. A Centred Moving Average (CMAt ) method
2
has been used to de-seasonalize the amount of elec-
tric fans sold and the time series of prices. Having
obtained a de-seasonalized time series of quantities
and prices, it is now possible to specify the regression
model, which is of the form:
lnQi,t = α + γ1 lnPi,t + γ2 lnDHH,t
+γ3 lnPOPHH,t + ǫt (1)
2The Centred Moving Average is a method used to de-
seasonalize time series. Analytically, it is of the form:
CMAt =
yt− m2
+ 2
(
yt− m2 +1
+ · · · + yt + · · · + yt− m2 −1
)
+ yt− m2
2m
(2)
wherem = 10 years represents the length of the moving average
and yt the observation at time t .
where:
– i = NE or i = EE if the electric fan is,
respectively, a non-energy efficient or an energy
efficient one.
– Qi,t is the quantity of electric fans of category i
sold.
– Pi,t is the price at time t of one electric fan of
category i.
– DHH,t is the disposable income, per household, at
time t .
– POPHH,t is the population per household.
A few words have to be spent on the variables chosen.
Qi,t represents the amount of electric fans sold and
de-seasonalized, as already mentioned, using the Cen-
tred Moving Average Method. Imports and Exports
have been neglected since their balance in the last
years has been almost zero (±0.1 %). DIHH,t rep-
resents the Disposable Income per Household. For
the first analyses, it has been preferred to the Mean
Capital Expenditure, which is usually the first choice
in most of the literature. Different income classes
have different expenditures and interpret goods differ-
ently. Moreover, the Disposable Income seems to be
a more suitable macroeconomic variable, that tends
to capture the whole household budget, before con-
sumption decisions are taken. Last but not least, Mean
Per Capita Expenditure is often obtained from surveys
and estimations, which make this variable more sub-
ject to biases. All monetary quantities have been taken
at constant prices, so to better capture supply/demand
dynamics rather than inflationary ones.3 This is par-
ticularly useful in a setting such as the Indian one,
where inflation in the past years has been showing
very high levels. Finally, Population per Household
has been chosen among the independent variables,
instead of floor space, as it seems more descriptive
of the consumption behavior of the different house-
holds, in particular when floor space data is scarcely
available.
Here, an arbitrary distinction between govern-
ment/commercial and private households has been
made. In order to obtain a better estimation of pri-
vate demand for energy efficient fans, the amount, in
square meters, of floor space belonging to government
3To be precise, in order to take inflation away from the time
series, the minimum between the inflation rate and the Con-
sumer Price Index for electric fans has been removed from the
price.
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Table 3 Non-energy efficient fans, summary of statistics
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) t-stat (p value)
α 9.7228∗∗ (0.7188) 13.53 (0.000)
lnPNE,t γ1 = −0.6798
∗∗ (0.0941) −7.22 (0.000)
lnDIHH,t γ2 = −0.0649 (0.0648) −1.00 (0.318)
lnPopHH,t γ3 = −1.1281
∗∗ (0.1321) −8.54 (0.000)
N = 142
F(3,138) = 574.4
Significance levels: † 10 %, ∗ 5 %, ∗∗ 1 %
and commercial buildings has been taken into consid-
eration4 and subtracted from the total. Afterwards, we
will use the average cooling capacity in square meters
of a ceiling fan and its ownership rates among house-
holds to determine how many fans are demanded in
the residential sector.
Within the residential sector, some care has to
be taken when considering the distribution of items
across different households. For what concerns elec-
tric fans, one important aspect to be kept into consid-
eration is the fact that different climatic regions show
different supply and demand patterns. However, since
urbanization is growing more in warmer regions, it is
not a loss of generality to assume that the distribu-
tion of electric fans and other appliances will closely
follow the growth in number of residential houses.
Another issue to be considered is that rural and urban
households have different behavior on the market. The
diffusion of electrical appliances is still very biased
toward urban areas, whereas rural populations rely on
more traditional means.5
In addition, the turnover ratio of fans has to be kept
into consideration, since it has strong impacts on the
demand of electrical appliances.
The informal sector captures an important share of
the market for electric appliances, traditional fans in
particular. While we assume that occupants of new
residential buildings avoid looking at the informal
sector, we will release this assumption when analyz-
ing the market for already existing, non-renovated
buildings. The methodology used in this case will be
4As of end 2012, Government and Commercial Buildings
accounted for about 800 million sq.m of floor space. Source:
USAID ECO-III Project.
5As an example, 81.8 % of urban households and 34.8 % of
rural households have an electric fan, as of 2012 (Chaturvedi
et al. 2014b).
presented in the “Estimation of the market for existing
buildings” section.
All variables have been tested for stationarity and
modified accordingly, using the method of seasonal
differences. Additional tests of normality and cointe-
gration have been run as well. Results for such tests
can be found in Appendix 2.
Table 3 summarizes the statistical results obtained
for non-energy efficient fans.
As can be noticed by looking at Table 3, γ1, the
price elasticity of demand for non-energy efficient
fans, is above −1, i.e., γ1 = −0.6798. This implies
that demand is fairly inelastic. In other words, a 1 %
decrease in the price of this category of fans will
cause an increase of 0.6798 % in the amount of items
demanded. Unsurprisingly, the amount of people per
household shows negative elasticity, meaning that the
lower the number of people sharing the same floor
space, the more appliances are needed. Conversely, the
disposable income per household shows no statistical
significance (p = 0.318). This is a surprising result.
The interpretation is that regular, non efficient fans
are seen as primary goods by many customers, in a
warm and humid country such as India. Their demand
Table 4 Energy efficient fans, summary of statistics
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) t-stat (p value)
α 15.2663 ∗∗(1.0567) 14.45 (0.000)
lnPE,t β1 = −0.9580
∗∗(0.1421) −6.74 (0.000)
lnDIHH,t β2 = 0.5087
∗∗(0.0698) 7.29 (0.000)
lnPopHH,t β3 = −1.0822
∗∗(0.1228) −8.81 (0.000)
N = 142
F(3,138) = 2554.9
Significance levels: † 10 %, ∗ 5 %, ∗∗ 1 %
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Table 5 Summary of elasticities for rural and urban households
Variable Coefficient Value p value
Rural
lnPRNE,t β
R
1 −0.2514 (0.000)
lnPRE,t β
R
1 −0.8075 (0.000)
Urban
lnPUNE,t β
U
1 −0.1869 (0.000)
lnPUE,t β
U
1 −0.6268 (0.000)
is not determined by the disposable income, but by
customers’ needs.
In order to assess the price elasticity of energy effi-
cient fans, their quantity has been regressed against
their average price, the disposable income per house-
holds and the population per household, all taken in
logarithmic form as before. Table 4 shows the results
obtained by our regression analysis.
Here, β1, the price elasticity of demand for energy
efficient fans, is very close to −1. Price is now a
determining factor for quantity demanded. A 1 %
decrease in the price of an energy efficient fan causes
an increase in the demand for the same good of almost
equal amount, i.e., β1 = −0.9580. Population per
household shows negative elasticity as before, and
the same conclusions can be drawn. In contrast, dis-
posable income is now statistically significant and
shows a coefficient β2 = 0.5087. This independent
variable is now much more important in explaining
the purchase propensity of efficient fans. Our results
suggest that energy efficient fans are not considered
primary goods as regular fans, and their purchase
depends primarily on income rather than on necessity.
It also proves that energy efficient fans still fall in the
category of niche, middle-high class products.
As mentioned, India presents strong differences in
income, and also in appliance diffusion, between rural
and urban areas. While the average disposable income
in rural India was about Rs. 4645.19 per Month as of
2013, the urban population had an average monthly
disposable income 53 % higher, about Rs. 7135.04.
On the same level, Mean Per Capita Expenditure for
durable goods in urban India, as of 2013, was 24.4 %
higher than in rural India (Rs. 68.43 vs. Rs 55.01).
As it is expected that more is spent in rural India for
primary goods rather than for “leisure” goods, it can
be inferred that urban India has more income avail-
able for non primary expenditures. As an example, the
market penetration of ceiling fans in urban areas was
81.8 % as of 2013, while in rural India was 34.8 %. It
is also true, however, that rural India holds the biggest
share of total Indian disposable income, about 55 %,
but it hosts about 70 % of the population.
In order to assess what is the impact of the Super
Efficient Equipment Program, the above model has
been applied, for the two categories of electric fans,
to the two categories of households, rural and urban.
Differently than before, as already mentioned, it is
not possible to use the disposable income as an inde-
pendent variable in this analysis. In fact, no separate
disposable income time series data on rural and urban
India is available. In order to overcome this issue,
the Mean Per Capita Expenditure for durable goods,
obtained by the NSSO Rounds, has been used. These
data are available separately for urban and rural house-
holds. Equation 3 expresses the linear regression mod-
els used to estimate price elasticities for rural and
urban households, and for non-energy efficient and
energy efficient fans.
lnQ
j
i,t = α + η
j
1 lnP
j
i,t
+η
j
2 lnMPCE
j
t + η
j
3 lnPOP
j
t + ǫt (3)
where i = NE or i = EE if the electric fan is,
respectively, a non-energy efficient or an energy effi-
cient one, and where j = R or j = U if the electric
fan belongs, respectively, to a rural or to an urban
household. The regression results are summarized in
Table 5.
Table 6 Estimated existing fan stock
Household Ownership Household Total fans Total fans
type rate with cooling fan informal + formal formal sector only
Urban OU = 81.8 % 52,994,112 158,982,338 39,745,584
Rural OR = 34.8 % 36,364,817 72,729,635 18,182,408
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In general, these results confirm the ones obtained
previously. However, having differentiated price elas-
ticities between urban and rural households will allow
us to predict future consumption of energy efficient
fans among the two groups, as done in the “Results
and discussion” section.
Future projections and future energy savings
Having found the price elasticities of demand, it is
interesting to apply the results obtained to the future
diffusion of energy efficient fans, making use of own-
ership rates and relying on the estimated growth rate
of floor space in the next few years in India (Kumar
2010). Other than being able to assess how the mar-
ket diffusion of these items changes when the price
moves, the following analysis allows to estimate the
future potential savings in terms of energy consump-
tion. The forecast covers a time interval of 3 years,
that is the pilot phase of the SEEP (Climate Invest-
ment Funds 2011). While the effective subsidy will
be implemented using an auctioning mechanisms with
multiple winners, according to the Super Efficient
Equipment Program the maximum subsidy that pro-
ducers can apply to the sale of energy efficient fans is
Rs. 250, or $3.81 (Climate Investment Funds 2013).
The projected savings have to be compared to the
baseline level (S = 0), so to see if the goal of an
avoided electricity capacity of 1900 MW in 3 years, as
foreseen by the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (Garnaik
2011) is reachable. The remaining assumptions are:
– Price elasticity of demand remains constant
between year 1 (Y1) and year 3 (Y3).
– Producers produce super efficient fans always
according to the minimum energy efficiency
requirements of the SEEP Program, whose guide-
lines state that such fans should not use more than
35W of power.6
– Non-energy efficient fans use approximately
65 W of power.
– There are no intermediate agents in the market for
electric fans.7
6As there is a cap to the maximum subsidy obtainable by a
producer, there will be no incentive to bear extra production
costs.
7This assumption is also made by the SEEP Scheme.
Table 7 Annual purchases per different household type and
different fans
Urban households Rural households
MPU,RR = 3, 354, 888 MPR,RR = 1, 534, 896
MPU,NR = 642, 432 MPR,NR = 293, 892
– Producers apply a price reduction of 100 % of the
subsidy to the final good8
Estimation of the market for existing buildings
While it is known and clear that India’s real estate
market is booming now and will keep booming in the
next few years, when discussing about the impacts
of energy efficiency financing on energy consump-
tion, existing households have to be considered in the
calculations as well. The survival rate of electrical
appliances, and of ceiling fans in our particular case, is
very important in estimating how many of these appli-
ances will be replaced on average, every year. This
number has to be summed up to the new appliances
needed for new constructions, so to give a complete
estimation of how many appliances are sold and what
their energy impact will be. The inclusion of existing
appliances requires an estimation of the lifetime of this
appliances. In order to do so, we make use of a Weibull
distribution, which is very helpful for estimating how
many appliances survive after years of use. The lit-
erature dealing with the estimation of cooling fans,
both commercial and domestic is not extensive. How-
ever, important articles have shed light on the problem.
Examples of the application of a Weibull distribution
for the estimation of the average life of a fan can be
found in Claassen et al. (1996) and in Mendenhall
and Sincich (2007). For a more theoretical approach,
please refer to Brown (1980). The Weibull distribu-
tion has a probability density function of the form
f (t) =
β
α
(
t
α
)β−1
e−(
t
α )
β
, where, α is the scale param-
eter, while t is the so called age of the function, such
that f (t)dt is the probability that an appliance fails in
the time interval dt . β is the so called shape parame-
ter, which determines how failures are distributed. The
shape parameter β can be smaller, equal, or grater than
one, depending on whether the failure rate decreases,
8Meaning that no fraction of the subsidy is used to reduce costs
that are not related to the production of energy efficient fans
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Table 8 Summary of cumulative projected avoided electricity capacity (in MWh) for urban households (compared to baseline S = 0)
and for existing fans only
Urban households
Subsidy (Rs.) Year % EE fans % Avoided capacity Avoided capacity
(w.r.t BAU= 17.80 %) in MWh in MWh
S = 220 1 18.09 % (+1.63 %) 0.15 % 730.3
3 19.99 % (+12.30 %) 1.10 % 14,940.1
S = 250 1 18.38 % (+3.25 %) 0.29 % 1460.6
3 20.29 % (+13.98 %) 1.25 % 16,945.7
S = 300 1 18.86 % (+5.95 %) 0.53 % 2669.4
3 20.79 % (+16.79 %) 1.50 % 20,348.5
QTOT,Urb,Y1 = 3, 997, 320 MWhUrb,BAU,Y1 = 500, 808.2
QTOT,Urb,Y3 = 10, 802, 412 MWhUrb,BAU,Y3 = 1, 353, 391.0
remains constant, or increases with time. While most
of the literature uses α = 1, here it has been chosen to
be α = 0.874 (Kim et al. 1996), so to take into account
possible lower quality controls, humidity, faulty elec-
tric lines, and so on. In addition, a β > 1 is considered,
i.e., β = 1.5 so that the probability of failures happen-
ing increases with the age of the appliance. The shape
parameter also determines the failure rate, or hazard
function, h(t) = β
α
(
t
α
)β−1
.
Given these parameters, it is now possible to calcu-
late the so called L10 value, which indicates the 10th
percentile of the Weibull distribution. In other words,
L10 represents the age at which 90 % of the fans is
still in operation, and, among producers, it is a pop-
ular indicator of the life of an electrical appliance.
Mathematically:
LQ=10 = α
[∫ t
0
h(u)du
] 1
β
≈ 0.19497 (4)
With α = 0.874 and β = 1.5, the average hourly
lifetime of a ceiling fan is approximately L10 =
19, 497 h. Assuming that a ceiling fan is used on
average for 7 h every day and for 300 days a year
(Chaturvedi et al. 2014b), which is an assumption that
takes into account that there could be variabilities in
fan usage due to climatic variations, the average life
of a ceiling fan in years has been estimated to be
L
y
10 = 9.28 years.
However, as said before, not all of the ceiling fans
will break after L10 = 19,497 h of use, and not all
of them which brake will be replaced by new ones.
This last aspect represents one additional issue that has
to be taken into account. In fact, in many developing
Countries, as well as in many less developed regions
of the OECD ones, the so called informal and sec-
ondary markets capture an important share of demand
for electrical appliances, which are many times refur-
bished items. This makes it difficult to keep track
of the number of sales. Such sectors cannot be ana-
lyzed in terms of the SEEP Program. In fact, it can be
inferred that demand is satisfied by local shops whose
sales of energy-efficient items are almost impossible
to track. Consequently, the impact of a subsidy scheme
in this “part” of the marked cannot be analyzed. Since
it is estimated that 75 % of the Indian economy is cap-
tured by the informal and secondary sectors (Nataraj
2011; Chakrabarti 2013), the demand belonging to this
percentage of households has to be subtracted from
the total demand for ceiling fans. While excluding
completely this share of demand for super efficient
appliances may seem wrong, we have to think of the
fact that secondary and informal markets need some
time to develop. In our case, it is hard to imagine a sig-
nificant presence of SEEP super efficient fans in sec-
ondary and informal markets already in the few years
of the pilot phase of the program. Moreover, the infor-
mal and secondary markets are dominated by traders
who deal with older, often re-assembled, appliances
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Table 9 Summary of cumulative projected costs of the SEEP for urban households (compared to baseline S = 0) and for existing
fans only
Urban households
Subsidy (Rs.) Year % EE fans Absolute avoided capacity Cost of subsidy
(w.r.t BAU= 17.80 %) in MW in Rp./USD
S = 220 1 18.09 % (+1.63 %) 0.35 159,085,341.36/2,422,822.02
3 19.99 % (+12.30 %) 7.10 475,068,474.94/7,235,150.35
S = 250 1 18.38 % (+3.25 %) 0.70 183,676,854.00/2,797,343.38
3 20.29 % (+13.98 %) 8.07 547,952,348.70/8,345,149.88
S = 300 1 18.86 % (+5.95 %) 1.27 226,168,365.60/3,444,476.36
3 20.79 % (+16.79 %) 9.69 673,746,436.44/10,260,956.10
QTOT,Urb,Y1 = 3, 997, 320 MWhUrb,BAU,Y1 = 500, 808.2
QTOT,Urb,Y3 = 10, 802, 412 MWhUrb,BAU,Y3 = 1, 353, 391.0
USD/INR=Rp. 65.6612
INR/USD=$0.01523
(Fernando 2009) or who dismember the appliances
themselves in order to sell the single components, as
it happens with LEDs, light emitting diodes, or CFLs,
compact fluorescent lamps (Chaturvedi et al. 2014a).
One other subtraction has to be made. In fact,
of the total existing 244,641,582 households, around
75,360,000 have no electricity, so it is fair to say
that members of these households will not enter
the market for new fans. This number comprehends
also those households belonging to the poorest urban
areas, around 13,700,000.9 But how many ceiling
fans are needed, on average, to cool down residential
buildings? In India, around 800 million m2 of floor
space belong to government and commercial build-
ings, while approximatively 10 billion m2 of floor
space belong to residential buildings (Manu et al.
2011). This implies that each household occupies, on
average, 40.88 m2 of space. Given that a ceiling fan
with a 120-mm blade cools down around 13 m2 of
space, net of furniture, we can infer that each house-
hold has three fans, on average. While we will keep
this estimation for the urban sector, being it in line
with the recent literature (Chaturvedi et al. 2014b), for
the rural sector we will again rely on Chaturvedi et al.
9Ministry of Statistics of India, 2011
(2014b), which consider the rural sector as possess-
ing, on average, two fans per household.10 While it
may seem unrealistic that rural India possesses such
high quantity of fans, it has to be understood that
electric fans are very cheap and among the first appli-
ances households buy, as intuitively described by van
Ruijven et al. (2011).
Now, in order to be able to use the number of ceil-
ing fans per household closest as possible to reality,
we will use fan ownership rates as found in Chaturvedi
et al. (2014b). The ownership rate for urban and rural
India are respectively, OU = 81.8 % and OR =
34.8 %. Given all the available data on floor space,
the number of households and the estimated amount
of ceiling fans per household, we can finally find the
stock of fans. The results are visible in Table 6.
In addition, rarely in these realities one electri-
cal appliance is replaced by a new one once it stops
functioning. To make our analysis more realistic, we
assume that 85 % of the broken items can be repaired,
which is a percentage in line with the average repara-
tion rate of electrical appliances. In order to see how
long a repaired electrical appliance lasts, the so called
10While being in line with our findings for what concerns the
urban households.
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Table 10 Summary of cumulative projected avoided electricity capacity (in MWh) for rural households (compared to baseline S = 0)
and for existing fans only
Rural households
Subsidy (Rs.) Year % EE Fans % Avoided capacity Avoided capacity
(w.r.t BAU= 17.80%) in MWh in MWh
S = 220 1 18.69 % (+5.00 %) 0.45 % 1018.6
3 20.62 % (+15.84 %) 1.42 % 8721.9
S = 250 1 19.07 % (+7.13 %) 0.64 % 1453.5
3 21.01 % (+18.03 %) 1.61 % 9928.1
S = 300 1 19.68 % (+10.56 %) 0.96 % 2151.6
3 21.65 % (+21.63 %) 1.94 % 11,907.6
QTOT,Rur,Y1 = 1, 816, 644 MWhRur,BAU,Y1 = 227, 600.1
QTOT,Rur,Y3 = 4, 909, 320 MWhRur,BAU,Y3 = 615, 069.1
Mean Time Between Failures has to be calculated. The
MTBF is (Zacks and Even 1966; Tavner et al. 2007):
MTBF = α · Ŵ(1+
1
β
) ≈ 0.874 · Ŵ(1.667)
= 0.7889 (5)
where Ŵ(x) =
∫∞
0 t
x−1e−tdt represents the Gamma
Function. The Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF)
is very useful in this context since a repaired or refur-
bished electrical appliance does not last as long as a
new one, on average. The MTBF tells us that repair-
ing/refurbishing an appliance increases its lifetime by
0.7889 years. In other words, maintenance extends
lifetime by 10 %, on average. The remaining 15 % of
fans that cannot be repaired, or whose reparation costs
are too high, leave the owner with no other choice but
replacing it with a new one. Having found what the
Table 11 Summary of cumulative projected costs of the SEEP for rural households (compared to Baseline S = 0) and existing fans
only
Rural households
Subsidy (Rs.) Year % EE Fans Avoided capacity Cost of subsidy
(w.r.t BAU= 17.80 %) in MW in Rp./USD
S = 220 1 18.69 % (+5.00 %) 0.48 74,696,767.99/1,137,609.37
3 20.62 % (+15.84 %) 4.15 201,861,419.76/3,074,288.86
S = 250 1 19.07 % (+7.13 %) 0.69 86,608,502.70/1,319,021.51
3 21.01 % (+18.03 %) 4.72 234,051,831.00/3,564,539.17
S = 300 1 19.68 % (+10.56 %) 1.02 107,254,661.76/1,633,456.32
3 21.65 % (+21.63 %) 5.67 289,846,252.80/4,414,271.48
QTOT,Rur,Y1 = 1, 816, 644 MWhRur,BAU,Y1 = 227, 600.1
QTOT,Rur,Y3 = 4, 909, 320 MWhRur,BAU,Y3 = 615, 069.1
USD/INR=Rp. 65.6612
INR/USD=$0.01523
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Table 12 Summary of cumulative projected avoided electricity capacity (in MWh) for all households (compared to Baseline S = 0)
and for existing fans only
All Households
Subsidy (Rs.) Year % EE Fans % Avoided Capacity Avoided Capacity
(w.r.t BAU= 17.80 %) in MWh in MWh
S = 220
1 18.28 % (+2.68 %) 0.24% 1748.9
3 20.19 % (+13.43 %) 1.20 % 23,662.0
S = 250
1 18.60 % (+4.47 %) 0.40 % 2914.1
3 20.52 % (+15.25 %) 1.37 % 26,873.6
S = 300
1 19.12 % (+7.39 %) 0.65 % 4821.0
3 21.06 % (+18.31 %) 1.64 % 32,256.8
QTOT,AllHH,Y1 = 5, 813, 964 MWhAllHH,BAU,Y1 = 728, 408.3
QTOT,AllHH,Y3 = 15, 711, 732 MWhAllHH,BAU,Y3 = 1, 968, 460.1
average age of a fan is in years, it is now possible
to estimate which is the number of purchases/repairs
needed. We also distinguish between Urban and Rural
Households, and also between repairable (RR) and not
repairable (NR) items. Following Taylor and Fujita
(2012), the annual purchases of non repairable appli-
ances are so calculated:
APi,NR =
average stock
lifetime
(6)
while the annual purchases of the repairable appli-
ances are so calculated:
APi,RR =
average stock
lifetime + MTBF
(7)
where i = U,R, depending on whether the household
under consideration belongs to urban or rural India.
Results can be seen in Table 7.
Table 13 Summary of cumulative projected costs of the SEEP for all households (compared to baseline S = 0) and for existing fans
only
All households
Subsidy (Rs.) Year % EE Fans Avoided capacity Cost of subsidy
(w.r.t BAU= 17.80 %) in MW in Rp./USD
S = 220 1 18.28 % (+2.68 %) 0.84 233,782,109.4/3,560,431.4
3 20.19 % (+13.43 %) 11.27 676,929,894.7/10,309,439.2
S = 250 1 18.60 % (+4.47 %) 1.39 270,285,356.7/4,116,364.9
3 20.52 % (+15.25 %) 12.79 782,004,179.7/11,909,689.1
S = 300 1 19.12 % (+7.39 %) 2.29 333,423,027.4/5,077,932.7
3 21.06 % (+18.31 %) 15.37 963,592,689.2/14,675,227.6
QTOT,AllHH,Y1 = 5, 813, 964 MWhAllHH,BAU,Y1 = 728, 408.3
QTOT,AllHH,Y3 = 15, 711, 732 MWhAllHH,BAU,Y3 = 1, 968, 460.1
USD/INR=Rp. 65.6612
INR/USD=$0.01523
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Table 14 Summary of cumulative projected avoided electricity capacity (in MWh) for all households (compared to baseline S = 0),
and for existing and new fans
All households
Subsidy (Rs.) Year % EE Fans % Avoided capacity Avoided capacity
(w.r.t BAU= 17.80 %) in MWh in MWh
S = 220 1 18.15 % (+1.97 %) 0.18 % 4689.3
3 20.05% (+12.64 %) 1.13 % 81,465.8
S = 250 1 18.44 % (+3.59 %) 0.32 % 8574.8
3 20.35 % (+14.33 %) 1.28 % 92,327.9
S = 300 1 18.93 % (+6.35 %) 0.57 % 15,139.8
3 20.86 % (+17.19 %) 1.54 % 110,793.5
QTOT,AllHH,Y1 = 21, 266, 796 MWhAllHH,BAU,Y1 = 2, 664, 431.8
QTOT,AllHH,Y3 = 57, 471, 477 MWhAllHH,BAU,Y3 = 7, 200, 371.5
Results and discussion
In order to estimate future energy savings obtain-
able after the introduction of a subsidy scheme such
as the Super Efficient Equipment Program (SEEP)
in India, we take results from Table 5 and apply
them to the future demand of energy efficient fans.
We extend our analysis by adding those fans that
are already existing and that might be replaced,
once broken, by energy-efficient fans. To do so,
we combine the results in Table 5 and with the
results obtained in the “Results and discussion”
section. We also introduce the “Cost of Subsidy,”
which represents the amount of financing effectively
needed to replicate the results in the following tables.
We start by analyzing, separately, the urban and the
Table 15 Summary of cumulative projected costs of the SEEP for All Households (compared to Baseline S = 0), and for Existing
and New Fans
All households
Subsidy (Rs.) Year % EE fans Avoided capacity Cost of subsidy
(w.r.t BAU= 17.80 %) in MW in Rp./USD
S = 220 1 18.15 % (+1.97 %) 2.23 849,183,164.28/12,932,804.84
3 20.05 % (+12.64 %) 38.79 2,294,836,076.61/34,949,665.00
S = 250 1 18.44 % (+3.59 %) 4.08 980,399,295.60/14,931,187.15
3 20.35 % (+14.33 %) 43.97 2,649,435,089.70/40,350,101.59
S = 300 1 18.93 % (+6.35 %) 7.21 1,207,714,344.84/18,393,538.36
3 20.86 % (+17.19 %) 52.76 3,596,656,030.66/54,774,606.45
QTOT,AllHH,Y1 = 21, 266, 796 MWhAllHH,BAU,Y1 = 2, 664, 431.8
QTOT,AllHH,Y3 = 57, 471, 477 MWhAllHH,BAU,Y3 = 7, 200, 371.5
USD/INR=Rp. 65.6612
INR/USD=0.01523
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rural sectors. We will then combine them to be able to
find the future energy savings for all households, first
for the stock of existing fans only, and then including
also our estimation on the “consumption” of new fans.
One additional remark has to be made. While
the maximum obtainable discount, according to
the scheme’s guidelines (Climate Investment Funds
2013), is Rp. 250, or $3.81 (which corresponds to the
maximum amount given as a subsidy to producers),
we tested also what the results could be in case the
discount would be lower, i.e., in case the producers
decide to keep part of the subsidy for themselves, or
in case the discount would be higher, i.e., in case some
economies of scale or other factors start playing a role
and the producers are able to apply a bigger discount
to the price of energy efficient fans.
Urban households
Results regarding energy savings of existing fans
in urban households are visible in Tables 8 and 9.
The discount of Rp. 250 brings an avoided electric-
ity capacity of 1.25 %, that translates into avoided
8.07 MW in year 3. When increasing the discount
to Rp. 300, we obtain an avoided electricity capac-
ity addition of 1.50 %, that translates into avoided
9.69 MW. Conversely, when reducing the discount
to Rp. 220, we obtain an avoided electricity capac-
ity of 1.10 %, or 7.10 MW. In year 3, the market
share of energy efficient fans is, respectively, 19.99,
20.29, and 20.79 % for the Rp. 220, the Rp. 250
and for the Rp. 300 discounts. Compared to the
Business-as-Usual case (market share of 17.80 %),
it means an increase of 12.30 %, of 13.98 %, and
of 16.79 %, respectively. Regarding the cost of the
Rp. 250 subsidy, in order to obtain such results the
amount to be financed would be of approximately Rp.
547,952,348.70, or $8,345,149.88. For the Rp. 220
and Rp. 300 subsidies, the costs would approximately
amount to Rp. 475,068,474.94, or $7,235,150.35, and
to Rp. 673,746,436.44, or $10,260,956.10.
Rural households
Despite giving home to the biggest share of Indian
population, rural households account for approx-
imately half the demand for fans. Lower income
and a more difficult access to markets (Balachandra
2011) are among the key issues. However, our
results are unexpected. In comparison to urban
households, rural households show a higher propen-
sity to the purchase of energy-efficient fans,
Fig. 1 Projected future electricity capacity from existing and new electric fans in all households
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following the results in Table 5. The Rp. 220,
Rp. 250, and Rp. 300 discounts achieve, respec-
tively, 1.42, 1.61, and 1.94 % in avoided electricity
capacity. The costs of the scheme sum up to,
respectively, Rp. 201,861,419.76 ($3,074,288.86),
Rp. 234,051,831.00 ($3,564,539.17), and Rp.
289,846,252.80 ($4,414,271.48). Market shares (and
percentage increase w.r.t the Business-as-Usual case)
become respectively 20.62, 21.01, and 21.65 %. What
is interesting is that the scheme seems to be more
successful, and economically efficient, in rural rather
than in urban households. As an example, the cost of
avoiding 1 W11 of electricity capacity, for the Rp. 250
subsidy, is Rp. 50 (or $0.76) in the rural sector and
Rp. 67.9 (or $1.03) in the urban sector. This means
that avoiding electricity capacity in urban areas costs
about 36 % more than what it costs in the rural ones
(Tables 10 and 11) .
All households, existing fans
In Tables 12 and 13, the combined total avoided elec-
tricity capacity for urban and rural households, for
existing fans only, are shown. Total avoided electricity
capacities achieved are 1.20 % for the Rp. 220 sub-
sidy, 1.36 % for the Rp. 250 subsidy, and 1.64 % for
the Rp. 300 subsidy. Market shares are, respectively,
20.19, 20.52, and 21.06 %. Avoided electricity capaci-
ties in MW are 11.27 MW in the RP. 220 subsidy case,
12.82MW in the RP. 250 subsidy case and 15.37MW
in the RP. 300 subsidy case.
All households, existing fans and new fans
In order to fully assess the energy saving potential
of the SEEP, we need to add the estimated demand
for new fans. In Tables 14 and 15, the combined
total avoided electricity capacity for urban and rural
households and for both existing and newly bought
fans is shown.
Figure 1 pictures the projected total avoided elec-
tricity capacity for the same subsidies and for the
Business-as-Usual (BAU) case. Results are in line
with recent findings from the Climate Investment
Fund12, which raises many doubts concerning the
111 W = 0.000001 MW
12http://www.trust.org/item/20130802094324-4tug3/
effectiveness of the SEEP. Such effectiveness, how-
ever, does not just concern the amount of energy
saved, but also the financial aspect of the scheme. The
same little energy savings, as shown in Tables 14 and
15, and in Fig. 1, could have been obtained with a
smaller investment. Our analysis shows that the fund-
ing needed, i.e., the fair value of the investment, would
have been 40,350,101.59 or Rp. 2,649,435,089.70,
approximately 19.3 % lower than what paid out by
the Clean Technology Fund for subsidizing the pro-
duction of energy efficient fans under the SEEP, i.e.,
around 50,000,000, or Rp. 3,283,060,000 (Climate
Investment Funds 2013). In addition, since the actual
subsidy is based on a bidding mechanism with multi-
ple bidders13, it is unlikely that the subsidy effectively
paid out will be equal to 250 Rp., i.e., the highest
possible. This will definitely reduce the costs of the
scheme, together with its effectiveness, as our results
show.
Conclusion
As can be seen by looking at Tables 14 and 15, while
it is clear that the Super Efficient Equipment Pro-
gram (SEEP) is capable of obtaining reductions in
the consumption of energy, at the same time these
are not of the amount one would expect and that has
been foreseen by its promoters, i.e., 19,000 MW at
the end of the third year, in particular in light of
the fact that in the (near) future the number of elec-
tric fans per house is going to increase as population
and per capita income increase. The reason for this is
twofold. From one side, the maximum subsidy obtain-
able by the industry, and consequently the maximum
discount applicable to the final price, is still low, i.e.,
Rp. 250 (3.81). Even when such maximum discount
is applied, it is barely sufficient to cover, on average,
the difference in price between energy efficient and
13“The program is voluntary and manufacturers will bid for the
amount of financial incentive as well as the total production
quota through a reverse bidding mechanism with a pre-specified
cap. The bidding mechanism is developed to allow multiple
winners. The incentive will be paid per unit super-efficient fan
to the manufacturer after the product leaves the factory for the
market. A strict Monitoring and Verification (M&V) mecha-
nism will check the quality and quantity of ceiling fans sold
under the program” (Chunekar and Singh 2013).
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regular, non-energy efficient, fans. Nevertheless, in
such a market, a competitive price is extremely impor-
tant. Since the discounted, after-subsidy price of
energy efficient fans will still be slightly higher than
the price of the non-energy efficient ones (on aver-
age, Rs. 1200 vs. Rs. 900, or $18.28 vs. $13.71),
not many customers will orientate their expenditures
towards the more efficient good. The second rea-
son can be found in the price elasticity of demand
for energy efficient fans, which proved not to be
very high. In fact, demand can be considered fairly
inelastic. This implies that reducing the price by
1 % does not cause an increase of 1 % in the
quantity of energy efficient fans demanded. Recall
in fact from Table 5 that βR,1 = −0.8075 and
that βU,1 = −0.6268, which implies an increase
(decrease) in quantity demanded of respectively
0.81 % for rural households and 0.63 % for urban
households every 1 % decrease (increase) in the price
of the good. What seems to be a necessary step
from the Government is to intervene to change the
price elasticity of demand for energy efficient goods.
Hindering the production, and consumption, of ineffi-
cient fans can achieve this goal. An additional inter-
vention could be the introduction and development of
awareness and advertising campaigns, so to increase
the knowledge about the differences between efficient
and regular fans, in terms of costs and also in terms of
the energy saving potential (Reddy and Shrestha 1998;
Kumar and Sharma 1998; Liu et al. 2015). On the
other hand, agencies such as the BEE and the Clean
Technology Fund should develop econometric mod-
els in order to estimate the fair value of the scheme
and afterwards to obtain more realistic projections in
terms of its energy reduction potential. One example
is the Super Efficient Equipment Program, developed
by the Bureau of Energy Efficiency under the National
Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency and partially
funded by the Clean Technology Fund. As our empiri-
cal tests have shown, the subsidy may not be the most
effective measure in obtaining the desired results. The
sought-after diffusion of energy efficient fans can-
not be obtained when the maximum discount offered
does not reach the cost of the alternative, inefficient,
product, in particular in a market where customers,
specially in urban areas, seem not to have captured
the distinction between efficient and regular items.
What can be done here, is increasing the subsidy,
since the amount of funding set aside by the Clean
Technology Fund for the scheme is well above what
is being currently spent with this level of subsidy, in
the sense that the same results, in terms of diffusion of
energy efficient fans, could have been obtained from
an investment 19.3 % lower. Nevertheless, despite it
limitations, the SEEP has to be intended as a market
transformation program which has the goal to allow
producers to switch in technology and to be able to
market fans that they do not produce today.
Future research and improvements are needed, in
particular for what concerns a more detailed specifica-
tion of the equations used to estimate elasticities and
a wider set of independent variables should be tested.
Moreover, finding the break-even subsidy that allows
the Super Efficient Equipment Program to reach the
desired avoided electricity capacity of 19,000 MW
proves to be a very important step. A strong label-
ing program, specifically designed for ceiling fans or
that integrates the BEE’s Standard and Labeling Pro-
gram already in place, could be designed, as to help
consumers make an informed choice about the poten-
tial savings obtainable from the purchase of a super
efficient ceiling fan against a bigger sum to be spent.
Additionally, what seems to be a key step is the intro-
duction of minimum energy performance standards
(MEPS), that could bring two desired results. First,
removing from the market inefficient fans with high
energy consumption; second, it could help concentrate
the producers’ financial efforts on more efficient fans,
thus obtaining economies of scale and reducing their
production cost. Finally, a subsidy could be designed
around the real production cost of a super efficient
ceiling fan, so to cover the fair price of their pro-
duction and to incentivize producers to develop and
market these appliances.
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A: Test statistics
A.1 Dickey-fuller unit-Root and normality tests
for regressions
Table 16 Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Test statistic 1 % Critical value 5 % Critical value 10 % Critical value
(a) lnQNE,t Z(t) −12.463 −3.500 −2.888 −2.578
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0000
(b)lnQEE,t Z(t) −12.463 −3.500 −2.888 −2.578
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0000
(c) lnQNE;R;t Z(t) −2.637 −3.497 −2.887 −2.577
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0855
(d) lnQEE;R;t Z(t) −5.228 −3.500 −2.888 −2.578
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0000
(e) lnQNE;U;t Z(t) −4.702 −3.497 −2.887 −2.577
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0855
(f) lnQEE;U;t Z(t) −13.879 −3.500 −2.888 −2.578
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0000
(g) lnPNE;t Z(t) −13.449 −3.500 −2.888 −2.578
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0000
(h) lnPEE;t Z(t) −8.532 −3.500 −2.888 −2.578
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0000
(i) lnMPCER;t Z(t) −4.141 −3.500 −2.888 −2.578
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0000
(j) lnMPCEU;t Z(t) −5.859 −3.500 −2.888 −2.578
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0000
(k) lnDIHH;t Z(t) −3.145 −3.497 −2.887 −2.577
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0234
(l) lnPopHH;t Z(t) −4.010 −3.500 −2.888 −2.578
MacKinnon approximate p value for Z(t) = 0.0000
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Table 17 Normality tests
Test Critical p value H0: Normality
statistic value (0: cannot reject null)
(a) [lnQNE,t = α + γ1lnPNE,t + γ2lnDIHH,t + γ3lnPOPHH,t + ǫt ]
Jarque - Bera 0.6237 5.5424 0.5000 0
Lilliefors 0.0510 0.0783 0.5000 0
(b) [lnQE,t = α + β1lnPE,t + β2lnDIHH,t + β3lnPOPHH,t + ǫt ]
Jarque - Bera 2.2090 5.5424 0.2573 0
Lilliefors 0.0486 0.0783 0.5000 0
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